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AUGMENTING ERISA WITH MARKET DISCIPLINE:
TRANSFORMING PENSION PLAN INTERESTS INTO
SECURITIES
Keir N. Dougall*
Private retirement pension plans1 have grown, during
roughly the last one hundred years,2 from nonexistence to the
point where they controlled $1.77 trillion in assets at the end
of 1988. 3 The dramatic increase in pension plan participation
* Editor in Chief, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 24,
1991; B.S., Cornell University, 1987; M.Eng'g, Cornell University, 1987; J.D.,
University of Michigan Law School, 1991. I would like to thank Professor Joel
Seligman for his helpful comments. Any errors, of course, remain mine.
1. For the purposes of this discussion, "private retirement pension plan" refers
to those plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended principally at
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988) (labor provisions) and in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.
(tax provisions)). 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1988) defines ERISA's coverage. Section 1003(a)
extends ERISA's coverage to private retirement pension plans by applying ERISA to
"any employee benefit plan if it is established or maintained-(1) by any employer
engaged in commerce ... (2) by any employee organization or organizations
representing employees engaged in commerce ... or (3) by both." 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)
(1988). Section 1003(b) exempts "governmental plans" from ERISA. Section 1003(b)
states: "The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any employee benefit
plan if-(1) such plan is a governmental plan (as defined in section 1002(32) of this
title) .... " 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1988); see also Borzi, A National Retirement Income
Policy: Problems and Policy Options, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 5, 9-10 (1985) ("ERISA
covers only part of the universe of employee benefit plans. Federal, state, and local
plans (the so-called governmental plans) are exempt."). Unless noted otherwise, my
discussion is limited to private retirement pension plans.
2. "Historians generally agree that the first formal pension plan in the United
States was established in 1875 by the American Express Company." Liebeler,
Pensions and the Cost of Securities Law Protection: The Implications of Daniel v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 11 LOy. L.A.L. REV. 709, 720 n.50 (1978).
3. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 360 (table no. 591) (1990) [hereinafter 1990
ABSTRACT]. The data from the Commerce Department show that the assets of all
private pension plans grew steadily throughout the 1980s to reach $1.772 trillion at
the end of 1988. Id. Insured private pension plans represented only $631.7 billion
of the assets at that time. Id.
In a Los Angeles Times interview, Howard Weizmann, the Executive Director of
the Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans, provided insight on the
magnitude of pension plan holdings:
Weizmann noted that by the end of 1987, private pension plans held $2
trillion in assets. This is equal to 32% of the U.S. gross national product. "A
24% share of the U.S. equity market belongs to pensions, and pensions supplied
34.8% of the investment capital provided by all non-banking institutions,"
Weizmann said. Private pension plans also account for 51% of all new savings
in the United States, he said.
Isgur, Pension Plans on Last Legs, Observer Says, L.A. Times, July 3, 1990, at D7,
col. 1 (Orange County ed.).
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during this period4 and the rise in the monetary value of
these plans5 indicates that many people consider private
pension plans to be an important vehicle for retirement
savings. Despite the popularity of pension plans, room for
improvement still exists.6
Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 19747 (ERISA) to protect pension plan participants and
to increase the number of plan participants.' Congress
4. Before 1875, pension plans did not exist. See supra note 2. As of March
1988, over 48 million civilian workers were covered by some form of pension plan.
1990 ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at 360 (table no. 590).
5. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Courts have recognized the growing
influence of pension plans. See, e.g., Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561
F.2d 1223, 1241 (7th Cir. 1977) ("In the early decades of the 20th century, only 38%
of invested capital was invested indirectly, and of this amount only 1/10 of 1% was
invested in pension funds. By 1962, the indirect sector of the capital markets had
jumped to 83% and pensions constituted 27% of this amount."), rev'd, 439 U.S. 551
(1979).
6. One commentator stated:
Virtually all segments of the employee benefits community have demanded that
a national retirement income policy be developed and articulated; that each
legislative and regulatory proposal be measured against this policy; that only
those proposals that further our national retirement income policy be adopted;
and that retirement income security, not revenue-raising, be the focus of
congressional debate.
Borzi, supra note 1, at 7. Demographic trends indicate that the need for improve-
ment will only grow with time. "In 1980, approximately fifty-six million Americans
were in the sixty to seventy age group, with about eighteen million older than
seventy. By 2040, these numbers will more than double, rising to 118 million in the
sixty to seventy age group with fifty-four million above seventy." Id. at 17 (citation
omitted).
7. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified principally at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (labor provisions) and
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (tax provisions)).
8. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1988) (declaring that Congress intended to
protect pension plan participants at the time of ERISA's enactment).
ERISA's legislative history suggests that Congress enacted ERISA "to increase the
number of individuals participating in retirement plans." S. REP. NO. 383, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1, 1 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4890, 4890.
Congress passed ERISA for other purposes as well:
In broad outline, the bill [a precursor to ERISA] is designed to:
(1) establish equitable standards of plan administration;
(2) mandate minimum standards of plan design with respect to the vesting
of plan benefits;
(3) require minimum standards of fiscal responsibility by requiring the
amortization of unfunded liabilities;
(4) insure the vested portion of unfunded liabilities against the risk of
premature plan termination; and
(5) promote a renewed expansion of private retirement plans and increase
the number of participants receiving private retirement benefits.
H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4640.
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enacted ERISA in the context of an existing social security
system.' ERISA's regulatory scheme, which depends on trust
law1" to monitor pension plan trustees,1 creates conflicts
within pension plan participant subgroups. 2 Such conflicts
have been clearly evident in the context of hostile takeovers'3
and social investing.'
4
These conflicts stem from the fundamental structure of
pension plans that ERISA envisions. ERISA plans are estab-
lished as trusts,'5 and plan trustees are required to act for
the exclusive benefit of plan "participants and their beneficia-
ries."1 6 Plan trustees often find the exclusive benefit require-
ment impossible to satisfy because most plan investment
decisions, when closely scrutinized, require trustees to choose
between the interests of subgroups of plan participants."
Under these circumstances, a trustee acts for the benefit of
one subgroup of plan participants at the expense of another.
9. "Because social security covers virtually all the private sector work force,
most pension plans are designed to supplement social security." Borzi, supra note 1,
at 43. Borzi described an individual's retirement income package as "[t]he
metaphorical 'three-legged stool' ... consisting of social security, employer-provided
pensions, and individual savings." Id. at 8.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988) ("[A]ll assets of an employee benefit plan shall be
held in trust by .one or more trustees."). See also Fischel & Langbein, ERISA's
Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105,
1107-08 (1988).
11. ERISA requires periodic reporting and disclosure about pension plans. See
29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1988). ERISA's main disclosure provisions require plan
administrators to provide plan participants and plan beneficiaries with a summary
plan description when they become a participant or beneficiary and every five years
thereafter. Id. §§ 1021(a)(1), 1022, 1024(b). Plan administrators also must furnish
a summary of the plan's annual report. Id. §§ 1021(a)(2), 1024(b)(3). Upon request,
plan administrators must provide plan participants and beneficiaries with
information about their plan interests, including the amount of their total accrued
benefits. Id. § 1025.
Plan administrators also are required to provide information to the Secretary of
Labor. Id. §§ 1002(13), 1021(b). This information includes the summary plan
description, a plan description, and annual reports that include financial and
actuarial statements. Id. §§ 1021(b), 1023.
In the context of nontransferable pension interests, however, plan participants and
beneficiaries have little use for this information. This information has little value
because plan participants and beneficiaries cannot transfer their interests between
pension plans and can make only limited pension plan investment decisions. See
infra Part IV.
12. See infra Parts I & II.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See supra note 10.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1988).
17. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 10, at 1119-21; see also infra Part I.
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Moreover, conflicts can occur between plan participants and
shareholders when corporations sponsor pension plans.'"
Corporate plan trustees who are officers of the sponsoring
corporation can fail to fulfill their duties to plan participants
when they are forced to choose between the interests of
employee plan participants and the interests of their corpora-
tion and its shareholders. 9
These specific problems tend to reflect ERISA's more general
problems. Not only does ERISA create conflicts within
participant subgroups as particular investment decisions are
made, but ERISA's limited restraints have led to fears of
abuse and a growing lack of confidence even within the
highest levels of government.2 ° It is not surprising, under
18. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 10, at 1121-22.
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. The former Administrator of the Labor Department's Office of Pension and
Welfare Benefits Programs, Ian Lanoff, stated:
Multiple jurisdiction for the administration of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) does not work. Despite eleven years of
effort, the Department of Labor (DOL), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) do not coordinate their
activities effectively when joint action is needed. These deficiencies seriously
hamper enforcement and policymaking activities. If ERISA is to be enforced
and pension policy is to be made in a rational rather than a haphazard manner,
ERISA administration must be consolidated into a single agency.
Klimkowsky & Lanoff, ERISA Enforcement: A Mandate for a Single Agency, 19 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 89, 89 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
The New York Times reported that "[p]otential abuse within the nation's $1.7
trillion pension system is a growing concern on Capitol Hill, where both House and
Senate panels are looking into the matter. Labor Secretary Elizabeth Hanford Dole
has asked Congress to approve funds for an additional 100 agents to police the
pensions system." Shortfall in Pension Funds Cited, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1990, at D4,
col. 4. "Unfortunately, [Secretary Dole's] proposals will do little to correct the abuse
and fraud that experts estimate costs [sic] the system more than $4 billion a year."
Bernstein, Plan to Regulate Pension Funds Isn't Adequate, L.A. Times, June 26, 1990,
at D3, col. 1. Currently, "fewer than 1 percent of the 900,000 private pension plans
covered by [ERISA] 'receive even passing scrutiny' from the government in any given
year." Swoboda, Pension Fund Called Vulnerable: Official Says Deficit Could Hit $8
Billion, Washington Post, June 14, 1990, at C1, col. 2, C7, col. 1 (discussing the
testimony of Ray Maria, deputy inspector general of the Department of Labor). In
1989, the Labor Department's Office of Inspector General warned "that lax
enforcement of federal pension laws could make the nation's private retirement
system the next major government cleanup program, similar to the one in the
savings and loan industry." Id. at Cl, col. 2. "An unknown portion of the $1.6
trillion in assets that are currently in private pension plans likewise may be at risk
.... Unless steps are taken now, today's S&L bail-out may become tomorrow's
ERISA nightmare." OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SEMIANNUAL
REPORT 3 (1989); see also infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text. But one
commentator disagrees:
Unlike the S&L mess, the consensus is that there's little systematic fraud in
the pension system, especially with underfunded plans. In addition, pension-
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ERISA's current structure, to hear that "[t]he private pension
system, which for years has been a major source of retirement
protection as well as investment capital for the economy, is in
decline as workers and employers turn to other savings
vehicles."21 Relying on ERISA alone, in this environment, is
imprudent.22
ERISA also leaves a large number of employees without any
pension plan coverage. The first step in distributing more
broadly the benefits of retirement savings through pension
plans must be to increase the availability of pension plans
that inspire confidence among plan participants.24
Courts have strained to minimize problems under ERISA's
pension plan governance structure by giving the language of
the statute an innovative interpretation. 5 Commentators
fund managers invest conservatively. A mere 1% to 3% of pension-fund assets
wound up invested in "junk" bonds.
"The S&L industry had people willing to commit fraud and engage in
criminal conduct," PBGC Executive Director James B. Lockhart said in a recent
speech. "Major pensions have almost no such people."
Benham, Does Nation's Pension System Threaten Another Bailout?, Investor's Daily,
Apr. 12, 1990, at 10, col. 1. The Department of Labor continues to express concern
over pension law enforcement. This spring Labor Secretary Lynn Martin said that
'in a relatively short time,' she will deal with issues involving pension plan
enforcement." Karr, Bush's Pension Proposal Would Expand Coverage, Ease
Portability of Benefits, Wall St. J., May 1, 1991, at All, col. 1.
21. Isgur, supra note 3, at D7, col. 1.
22. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
23. Approximately 48 million civilian workers, which represent only 40.8% of all
civilian workers, were covered by pension plans as of March 1988. 1990 ABSTRACT,
supra note 3, at 360 (table no. 590). Simple math reveals that almost 70 million
civilian workers, representing the remaining 59.2% of such workers, were not
covered.
24. See generally Borzi, supra note 1, at 23-30. In her call for a national
retirement income policy, Borzi states, "[Congress] should consider how to increase
pension coverage [and] increase eligibility for plan participation . . . ." Id. at 22-23.
Congress, of course, has been very concerned with protecting the interests of pension
plan participants. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Adequate protection will
inspire confidence.
25. In Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069
(1982), Judge Friendly was called upon to reconcile the provision of ERISA that
requires pension plan trustees to act for the exclusive benefit of plan participants
with the provision that allows plan trustees to serve simultaneously as officers of the
sponsoring corporation. He stated that even if a trustee's action incidentally benefits
the sponsoring corporation, the trustee will not violate ERISA's exclusive benefit rule
if the action is "made with an eye single to the interests of the participants and
beneficiaries [of the plan]." Id. at 271. Judge Friendly, in dictum, agreed with the
trustees that the "exclusive benefit of the plan beneficiaries" could, in some instances,
permit the trustees to act for the exclusive benefit of plan beneficiaries and the
company plan sponsor. Id. at 271-73. This interpretation appears to be a strained
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have pressed for adjustments in the definition of a trustee's
fiduciary duties.26 These approaches to solving problems
under ERISA are inherently limited because they rely solely
upon courts and a federal insurance program to guarantee the
welfare of plan participants.
To provide needed monitoring and disciplining of pension
plan trustees, market forces should be used to augment trust
law in governing pension plans. By transforming pension plan
interests into transferable securities and by developing a
market for such interests, the securities laws and the forces of
competition would discipline plan trustees, augmenting the
duties imposed by trust law.28 Such a pension plan interest
would resemble a transferable interest in a mutual fund.
Plan participants would not need to rely exclusively on
courts to redress grievances with plan trustees because they
would be able to transfer their interests out of a given pension
plan when they disagree with their trustee's investment
strategy. This approach would effect a significant change from
current practice because a participant's pension investment
decision would be completely independent of a participant's
employer or decision to change jobs.29 Congress should enact
reforms that supplement ERISA's trust law with market forces
to foster popular confidence in the pension system and to deter
abuse by pension plan trustees. Congress should transform
pension plan interests into securities.
Part I of this Note provides general background information
about pension plans and details the problems that ERISA
creates because of its dependence on trust law. Part II
canvasses recent problems in pension plan governance that
courts and pension plan members have faced in takeover
defense and social investment contexts, demonstrating that
reading of ERISA. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 10, at 1127-28 (criticizing
Bierwirth's focus on incidental benefits in the interpretation of ERISA's exclusive
benefit rule).
26. Professors Fischel and Langbein argue that a trustee's fiduciary duty to act
for the exclusive benefit of plan members should include a duty of impartiality.
Fischel & Langbein, supra note 10, at 1107.
27. ERISA provides for criminal penalties and civil enforcement of its provisions.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1132 (1988). Civil actions may be brought by plan participants,
plan beneficiaries, fiduciaries, or the Secretary of Labor. Id. § 1132(a). In addition,
ERISA provides for the establishment of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC), which insures some pension plan participants from losses. Id. §§ 1301-1371.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. See infra note 104.
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ERISA's use of trust law cannot respond adequately to these
problems. Parts I and II draw on an analysis of ERISA
presented by Professors Fischel and Langbein, 3° but argue
that their proposals for changing ERISA inadequately address
the problems they identify. Part III argues that the economic
realities of the pension plan transaction support the conclusion
that an interest in a pension plan is a security. Part IV
describes the advantages that will flow from applying the
securities laws to all pension plan interests and from using a
market in pension plan interests as a monitoring tool. Part IV
argues that the advantages of such an approach to pension
interests would outweigh its costs.
I. ERISA PLANS, PARTICIPANTS, AND SUBGROUPS
Pension plans are financial arrangements under which
employees can defer present income in favor of retirement
benefits.31  Most plan participants belong to corporate
plans.3 2  Pension plans may be either defined-benefit plans
or defined-contribution plans.3 3  A defined-benefit plan
guarantees a fixed level of benefits to plan members.34
30. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 10.
31. Id. at 1111 ("A pension plan envisions a program of savings during the
worker's period of employment, followed by distribution to the worker and his spouse
during their retirement. Such a program may endure for decades."). The Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) gives this definition:
[An employee benefit plan is] a pension, profit-sharing, or similar plan. It does
not include welfare and similar plans which provide for hospitalization or
disability benefits, funeral expenses, or social or cultural activities. These
latter plans historically have not been considered subject to the securities laws
because they do not involve any expectation of financial return on the
employee's part.
Employee Benefit Plans, 1933 Securities Act Release No. 33-6188, 45 Fed. Reg. 8960,
8960 n.3 (Feb. 11, 1980) [hereinafter Release No. 33-6188].
32. "Perhaps the largest single category of plans in terms of the number of
participants are so-called 'corporate' plans .... Such plans all share the common
characteristic of being established by corporations." Release No. 33-6188, supra note
31, at 8964.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34)-(35) (1988). See also 2 L. LOSS & J. SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1031 (3d ed. 1989) ("In a broad sense, all employee benefit
plans can be reduced to two basic categories: defined benefit plans and defined
contribution plans.") (footnote omitted).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1988) (providing a technical definition of defined-
benefit plan); see also 2 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 33, at 1031 ("A defined
benefit plan pays fixed or determinable benefits."); Fischel & Langbein, supra note
10, at 1112.
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Defined-benefit plans accumulate assets for retirement
benefits from two sources. First, a defined-benefit plan
acquires assets through contributions by participants or their
employers into the plan.3" Second, the assets of a defined-
benefit plan are invested for profit by the plan trustee. 36 If
the yield from defined-benefit plan investments does not
provide sufficient income to meet plan obligations, additional
contributions to the plan will be required.3"
Inaccurate actuarial estimation may lead to overfunding or
underfunding of defined-benefit plans because trustees of
defined-benefit plans rely on actuarial analysis to determine
the level of contributions required to fund future benefits.38
An important characteristic of the defined-benefit plan is that
the plan sponsor, usually the employer, bears the risk of poor
investment decisions. 3' Title IV of ERISA created the Pen-
sion Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)4° to insure most
35. 2 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 33, at 1032 ("Both defined benefit and
defined contribution plans can provide for employee contributions, and thus be
contributory, or rely solely on employer contributions and be noncontributory.").
36. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), the
Court discussed a defined-benefit plan (the "Fund") established through a collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 554 & n.3. The Court stated:
It is true that the Fund, like other holders of large assets, depends to some
extent on earnings from its assets. In the case of a pension fund, however, a far
larger portion of its income comes from employer contributions, a source in no
way dependent on the efforts of the Fund's managers.
Id. at 561-62.
37. The SEC described the operation of defined-benefit plans this way:
The benefits ordinarily are described in a formula which specifies the amount
payable in monthly or annual installments to participants who retire at a
certain age. As long as the plan and the employer(s) contributing to the plan
remain solvent, and the plan continues to be operated, vested participants will
receive the benefits specified. In the event the investment results of the plan
do not meet expectations, the employer(s) usually will be required, on the basis
of actuarial computations, to make additional contributions to fund the
promised benefits.
Release No. 33-6188, supra note 31, at 8963 (footnotes omitted).
38. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 10, at 1149.
39. As Professors Fischel and Langbein explain:
Under a defined benefit plan, the employer bears the investment risk. Since
the employer has promised to provide benefits at a certain level, the employer
remains liable to pay the benefits even if the fund turns up short. By the same
token, when investments yield unexpectedly high returns, the employer's liabili-
ty to contribute to the plan is correspondingly reduced.
Id. at 1112-13.
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1371 (1988). See Note, Trading Fairness for Efficiency:
Constitutionality of the Dispute Resolution Procedures of the Multiemployer Pension
Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 71 GEo. L.J. 161, 162 (1982) (authored by Donna
Brown Grossman) (discussing the establishment and subsequent expansion of the
PBGC's role).
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defined-benefit plan participants4' against the inability of a
corporate sponsor to make required contributions to the
plan.42 Defined-benefit plan sponsors pay a premium for the
PBGC's insurance.43 In other words, if because of poor
investments a defined-benefit plan is underfunded when
benefits become due, the corporate sponsor" or the PBGC
must satisfy the deficiency.4"
By contrast, participants in a defined-contribution plan bear
the risk of poor investment decisions.46 Defined-contribution
plans are similar to defined-benefit plans because they also
accumulate assets for retirement benefits through contributions
to the plan and through the investment of plan assets.47
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a), 1321 (1988). Section 1302(a) describes Congress's
purposes in creating the PBGC. One of those purposes was "to provide for the timely
and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits to participants and beneficiaries
under plans to which this subchapter applies." Id. § 1302(a)(2). Section 1321(a)
establishes broad PBGC insurance coverage of pension plans subject to the
limitations of § 132 1(b): "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this
section applies to any plan. . . ." Id. § 1321(a). Section 1321(b) carves out exceptions
to the broad coverage language of § 1321(a), the most important of which is the
exception for defined-contribution plans. Defined-contribution plans are not insured
by the PBGC. Id. § 1321(b) ("This section does not apply to any plan-(1) which is
an individual account plan [(a defined-contribution plan)], as defined in paragraph
(34) of section 1002 of this title.... ."); see also Klimkowsky & Lanoff, supra note 20,
at 89 n.2 ("Title IV of ERISA creates the PBGC as an independent corporation within
the Department of Labor that is charged with administering the termination
insurance program for defined benefit plans."); Note, Who Should Pay When Federally
Insured Pension Funds Go Broke?: A Strategy for Recovering from Wrongdoers, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 308, 311 & n.15 (1988) (authored by J. Robert Suffoleta, Jr.).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1322 (1988) (defining the types of benefits the PBGC guarantees);
see also Note, supra note 41, at 311-13 ("As a federal insurance program, the PBGC
functions much like a private insurance company. The PBGC collects premiums from
all of its customers to pay for the failure of a relatively small number of pension
programs.") (footnote omitted).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1306 (1988) (authorizing PBGC to assess premiums).
44. See supra note 39.
45. See Release No. 33-6188, supra note 31, at 8966.
46. ERISA gives this definition:
[A defined-contribution plan is] a pension plan which provides for an individual
account for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount
contributed to the participant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and
losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be
allocated to such participant's account.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1988); see also Fischel & Langbein, supra note 10, at 1112
("Defined contribution and defined benefit plans allocate investment risk oppositely.
Under a defined contribution plan, the employee bears the burden of disappointing
investment results and pockets the gains from good results."); Borzi, supra note 1, at
39 ("With a defined contribution plan, the risk of loss for poor investment perfor-
mance falls on the participant, not the employer.").
47. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1988).
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Defined-contribution plan participants reap a pro rata share
in profits that the plan realizes.48 The PBGC does not,
however, insure defined-contribution plans. 49  A defined-
contribution plan does not guarantee profits, which places the
risk of poor plan investments on the shoulders of plan
participants.5" Although the distinction between defined-
benefit and defined-contribution plans is important, it is not
the only distinguishing characteristic of pension plans.
The United States Supreme Court and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) have focused on two additional
factors when analyzing pension plans. The first factor is
whether a given plan is "voluntary" or "compulsory."5' The
Court defined a compulsory plan as one where "[e]mployees
had no choice as to participation in the plan, and did not have
the option of demanding that the employer's contribution be
paid directly to them as a substitute for pension eligibility."52
The second factor is whether a given plan is "contributory" or
"noncontributory."53  The Court defined a noncontributory
plan as one in which the participants' employer made all
contributions to the plan for the participants and in which
"employees paid nothing to the plan themselves."54 Currently,
corporate plan sponsors may establish both defined-benefit
and defined-contribution plans so that participation in a given
plan is either voluntary or compulsory.55 Similarly, sponsors
may establish both defined-benefit and defined-contribution
plans as either contributory or noncontributory.5"
48. See id. "[D]efined contribution plans maintain individual accounts for all
participating employees. These accounts reflect each participant's share in the
underlying trust assets and are adjusted annually to take into account plan contribu-
tions, earnings and forfeitures." Release No. 33-6188, supra note 31, at 8963
(footnote omitted); see also 2 L. LOSS & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 33, at 1032 ("[A]
defined contribution plan does not guarantee a fixed amount of benefits. Rather,
benefits vary depending on such factors as the amount of plan contributions and the
investment success of the plan.") (footnote omitted).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 1321 (b)(1) (1988); see supra note 41.
50. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
51. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 553 (1979);
Release No. 33-6188, supra note 31, at 8964.
52. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 553.
53. See id.; see also Release No. 33-6188, supra note 31, at 8964-65.
54. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 553.
55. 2 L. LOSS & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 33, at 1032.
56. See id.; see also Release No. 33-6188, supra note 31, at 8963 ("Both defined
benefit and defined contribution plans can provide for employee contributions.").
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In addition, when sponsors establish pension plans they may
choose to designate one of their officers as the plan trustee.
57
ERISA trustees are required to act "for the exclusive purposes
of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their
beneficiaries ...."58 Although the exclusive benefit require-
ment would seem to be adequate, in theory, for the protection
of participants, it has proved insufficient in practice. 9
Professors Fischel and Langbein note that there are many
interested constituencies within any group of pension plan
participants.6 0 When the interests of these constituencies or
plan subgroups diverge, the plan trustee faces the difficult
task of acting for the exclusive benefit of the different plan
subgroups.
At least three easily identifiable subgroups comprise the
participants of virtually every pension plan: young employees,
employees close to retirement, and retired beneficiaries.61
Each group places a different value on its expected stream of
future retirement payments. The relative value of current
income to deferred retirement income is higher for new
employees than for employees close to retirement.6 The
income stream from a current job typically accounts for the
largest part of the assets of young employees, who will retire
in the distant future. 3 A young employee's retirement
benefits, when discounted to present value, comprise a small
fraction of her current assets.64 Using a similar analysis,
employees closer to retirement would consider their retirement
benefits to be a larger percentage of their total assets. These
different participant subgroups, which place different values
57. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1988); see also Fischel & Langbein, supra note 10, at
1126-28 (arguing that because the employer bears the risk of bad investment
decisions in defined-benefit plans, allowing the trustee of the plan to be a corporate
officer is reasonable).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1988).
59. See infra Part II.
60. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 10, at 1119-22.
61. See id. at 1120-21.
62. See id.
63. Professor Coffee states:
[T]he manager's most important asset is his or her job. Although the manager
generally does not have a recognized property right in his [or her] employment
relationship with the corporation, this relationship still has a present value to
the manager equal to the discounted earnings stream he or she expects to
receive from that job (or career path) until retirement.
Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 17 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
64. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 10, at 1120.
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on current jobs and retirement benefits, cannot be expected to
view a given investment decision with unanimity.
A particular investment decision may divide plan beneficia-
ries along other lines. For instance, a plan trustee might be
forced to decide whether to invest in the securities of a profit-
able corporation that is a notorious polluter.65 Although one
might expect participants closer to retirement to favor maxi-
mizing profits, they can be expected to divide along lines not
necessarily dependent upon age concerning the question of
whether to maximize plan profits at a potential cost to the
environment. The interests of plan participants concerned
with the environment are sacrificed by the plan trustee who
chooses to favor profit maximization by investing in the
polluter. A trustee who must act for the exclusive benefit of
plan participants faces the impossible dilemma of trying to
satisfy all plan members when an investment decision
necessarily will favor one participant subgroup over another.
Although this flaw in ERISA's governance structure can arise
in every investment decision, it surfaces most starkly where
decisions involve social investment and takeover defenses.
Conflicts between plan participant subgroups will be abated if
pension plan interests are readily transferable.
II. CONFLICTS BETWEEN ERISA PLAN PARTICIPANTS
ERISA's pervasive regulatory scheme, which depends on
trust law to monitor pension plan trustees, creates conflicts
within plan participant subgroups in corporate takeover
defense and social investing contexts. Although these contexts
bring participant conflicts into high relief, any plan asset
investment decision by a trustee can create conflicts.66
A. The Pension Plan Takeover Defense
Diversion of pension plan assets to fend off a hostile corpo-
rate takeover has generated conflicts within subgroups of plan
65. See infra Part II.B.
66. See supra Part I.
Pension Plan Interests 721
participants.67 In Donovan v. Bierwirth,68 the management
of the Grumman Corporation was confronted with a hostile
tender offer from the LTV Corporation and Grumman's
management took defensive measures.69 Immediately prior
to the takeover attempt, the Grumman Corporation Pension
Plan held 525,000 shares of Grumman stock valued at roughly
twenty-five dollars per share. 7' LTV's tender offer was for up
to seventy percent of Grumman stock at forty-five dollars per
share.71 The trustees of the Grumman Corporation Pension
Plan were the chairman of Grumman's board of directors, its
chief financial officer, and the treasurer of Grumman Aero-
space.72 The Grumman Pension Plan trustees helped to fend
off LTV's hostile tender offer by voting not to tender the
Grumman Pension Plan's Grumman stock73 and by causing
the Grumman Pension Plan to purchase large blocks of the
stock.74 The Plan purchased Grumman stock at inflated
prices during the battle for corporate control and suffered
substantial losses when the takeover attempt was defeated.
The newly purchased stock plummeted to its pretakeover
value when the speculation surrounding LTV's tender offer
ended.75
Bierwirth involved a defined-benefit plan.76 Professors
Fischel and Langbein point out that if a defined-benefit plan
trustee defends against a hostile takeover, the interests of
younger plan participants and shareholders will be sacrificed,
67. See generally Fischel & Langbein, supra note 10, at 1138-43.
68. 538 F. Supp. 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd as modified, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
69. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d at 266-67. The Grumman Board decided to oppose the
LTV offer after Dillon, Read & Co., opined that the offer was inadequate. Id. at 266.
Defensive measures taken after a hostile tender offer are not uncommon. Rosenzweig
notes that a target's management often will sue a raider in an attempt to fend off a
tender offer. Rosenzweig, Target Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 110, 111 (1986).
70. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d-at 266-67.
71. Id. at 265-66.
72. Id. at 265, 267. Grumman Aerospace was a subsidiary of the Grumman
Corporation at the time. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. at 466.
73. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d at 268.
74. Id. at 269.
75. Id. at 268-69. The Grumman Plan purchased over 1.1 million shares of
Grumman stock in October 1981 at prices ranging between $36.62 and $38.61, raising
the Plan's holdings from just under 4% to roughly 8% of Grumman's outstanding
shares. Id. at 269. The LTV hostile takeover attempt failed. Fischel & Langbein,
supra note 10, at 1139. When the Second Circuit rendered its opinion in May 1982,
Grumman stock was trading at just over $26 per share, close to its preoffer price.
Bierwirth, 680 F.2d at 269.
76. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d at 267.
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and if a defined-contribution plan trustee uses the defense,
older plan participants' interests will be sacrificed.77
After a successful pension plan takeover defense, the
defending plan will likely suffer an immediate loss of funds for
payment to retirees.7" Beneficiaries (typically older retirees)
of defined-benefit plans, however, will not experience a
diminution in plan benefits after a successful takeover defense
because the employer has guaranteed that a defined benefit
will be paid to them. The employer and its shareholders will
be forced to use their own resources to make up the shortfall
in plan assets.7 9 These are resources that could have been
used to develop corporate opportunities, pay dividends, and
generate new jobs for current employees. Therefore, if a
defined-benefit plan is used to defend against a hostile take-
over, the interests of younger employee-participants and
shareholders are sacrificed for the benefit of older employee-
participants and retirees.8 0
77. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 10, at 1140-41.
78. A pension plan that successfully thwarts an attempted takeover of its
sponsoring corporation by purchasing its sponsor's shares at the high prices induced
by the tender offer will likely lose money because the price of the newly purchased
shares will fall when the takeover attempt is defeated.
The best available data show that if a firm fends off a bid, its profits decline,
and its stock price (adjusted for inflation and market-wide changes) never tops
the initial bid, even if it is later acquired by another firm. Stock of firms
adopting poison pills falls in price, as does the stock of firms that adopt most
kinds of anti-takeover amendments to their articles of incorporation.
Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 501 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989) (citations omitted).
79. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text; see also Fischel & Langbein,
supra note 10, at 1140 (discussing injury to Grumman shareholders from the loss
incurred by the Grumman defined-benefit plan).
80. There is anecdotal evidence that the Grumman Pension Plan participants in
Bierwirth were divided over the issue of the trustees' takeover defense decision and
the use of plan assets for that end. The Bierwirth court states:
[A] supporting affidavit of one of the Plan participants alleged that:
[Sipontaneously and within days after this suit was commenced, Grumman
employees at all levels and in all departments began to circulate petitions
expressing their approval of the trustees' actions, as participants in the Pension
Plan. To date, petitions have been signed by approximately 17,000 of the
22,000 employees who are plan participants and beneficiaries.
Bierwirth, 680 F.2d at 265. Of course, it is not possible to determine why those
17,000 employees who signed the petition were in favor of the trustees' actions from
the statement of the Bierwirth court alone. What is clear, however, is that 5,000
employees did not sign the petition. Whatever their reasons were, it is plausible to
assume that some number of those 5,000 were opposed to the trustees' actions. It
thus seems apparent that the Bierwirth plan participants were divided on the issue
of the trustees' decision.
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Similarly, a defined-contribution plan will suffer an immedi-
ate loss of funds if the trustee's takeover defense is success-
ful."' Beneficiaries of defined-contribution plans will suffer
a diminution in retirement benefits because they bear the risk
of plan losses.8 2 The defined-contribution plan trustee's
decision to defend against a takeover decision indirectly
transfers wealth from older employees and retirees to newer
employees and shareholders. This transfer occurs because the
pension plan's assets, as opposed to the corporate assets of
shareholders, are spent to thwart the takeover and to main-
tain present jobs rather than to provide retirement benefits.8 3
At least one court has explicitly recognized that an invest-
ment decision by a defined-contribution plan trustee creates
conflicts within subgroups of plan participants. 4 The court
concluded that the best solution was for the trustee to act in
a neutral manner and in "the best interests of beneficiaries in
the abstract as beneficiaries."85 Under this standard, a plan
81. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. In this scenario, the trustee of a
defined-contribution plan does not tender any of its target (or sponsor) shares to the
bidder and purchases target shares to prevent the bidder's tender offer. This scenario
is Bierwirth with a defined-contribution instead of a defined-benefit plan.
82. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
83. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 10, at 1140-41.
84. Danaher Corp. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 635 F. Supp. 246, 250
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
In Danaher, the court discussed the duties of the trustee of a defined-contribution
plan when the sponsoring company is faced with a hostile tender offer. The type of
plan involved in Danaher was an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP). Id. at 246-
47. An ESOP is a variety of defined-contribution plan. 2 L. LOSS & J. SELIGMAN,
supra note 33, at 1032. At issue was the ESOP trustee's decision not to tender the
ESOP's shares to the hostile bidder. Danaher, 635 F. Supp. at 249. The trustee
defended his decision on the ground that he did not believe that the ESOP
participants wanted him to tender. Id. In dictum, the court suggested that the
trustee might breach his fiduciary duties by carrying out the wishes of the benefi-
ciaries. Id.
The court suggested that a trustee does not have to do what plan participants
want; plan participants do not always know what they want or they might want the
wrong things. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 10, at 1141 ("[T]he court concluded
that participants could not be trusted to make the decision whether or not to tender.
This reasoning is a troubling variation of ERISA's protective policy.").
In concluding that a trustee should not be guided by a vote of the ESOP partici-
pants, the court discussed conflicting interests of the participants:
[T]he notion that the Plan's vote should be governed by the wishes of its
presumptive beneficiaries distorts the fiduciary's obligations. Present
participants have no interest in voting for what will benefit participants in the
future if such a vote results in those benefits going to persons other than
themselves. A participant would presumably rather see plan benefits slashed
than lose completely the benefits of employment and independence.
Danaher, 635 F. Supp. at 250.
85. Danaher, 635 F. Supp. at 250.
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trustee theoretically could act in such a way as to leave all
participants discontented without violating ERISA.
Commentators have argued that when corporate pension
plan trustees purchase or sell target shares during a contested
tender offer, their actions should be scrutinized and found to
violate ERISA if they are motivated by something other than
the interests of the plan's participants: 6 "When corporate
officials also serve as pension plan trustees, especial conflicts
are created. Particularly during a takeover attempt, such
trustees may be tempted to use plan assets to provide a
benefit to either themselves or the target corporation manage-
ment rather than plan participants.""7 Although this conflict
of interest may be very real, Fischel and Langbein's analysis
requires a more searching inquiry. Enjoining a plan trustee
in a takeover context necessarily means choosing the interests
of one plan participant subgroup over another.8  In
Bierwirth, the court declined to adopt a per se rule against a
corporate trustee who invests pension assets during a takeover
contest, but did hold the Grumman corporate trustees liable
for a breach of ERISA's exclusive benefit rule. 9
86. See, e.g., Comment, Making a Prudent Response to a Tender Offer: The
Corporation Trustee's Dilemma Under ERISA, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 839, 842 (1983)
(authored by Elizabeth J. Buck) (arguing that "it is virtually impossible for
corporation trustees to satisfy ERISA's fiduciary standards when they use pension
plan assets to defeat a hostile takeover"); Note, The Duties of Employee Benefit Plan
Trustees Under ERISA in Hostile Tender Offers, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1692, 1719 (1982)
(authored by Frank M. Cappuccio) (arguing that "during a tender offer, trustees who
are also officers of the target should be uniformly barred from purchasing the target's
securities with plan assets"); cf. Junewicz, The Appropriate Limits of Section 14(e) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1171, 1202 & n.205 (1984)
(arguing that purchasing target stock for entrenchment purposes violates the
securities laws and ERISA).
87. Comment, supra note 86, at 840.
88. A rule preventing defined-contribution plan assets from being used to place
target stock in friendly plan hands during a hostile takeover defense favors older
employees and beneficiaries. The defined-contribution plan would not be allowed to
risk the losses that surround a successful takeover defense. Because older employees
value their benefits more than younger employees, they should be less willing to
sacrifice assets for future benefits in order to spare current jobs.
A rule preventing defined-benefit plan assets from being used to place target stock
in friendly plan hands during a hostile takeover defense favors shareholders and
younger employee-participants. The defined-benefit plan would not be allowed to risk
the losses that surround a successful takeover defense. Defined-benefit plan losses
must be replaced with corporate assets. Thus, no corporate assets that could inure
to the benefit of shareholders or younger employees would be required to make up the
losses prevented by the rule.
89. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 469-70, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd
as modified, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
SPRING AND SUMMER 1991] Pension Plan Interests 725
B. The Social Investment of Pension Plan Assets
Using pension assets for "social investment" purposes
presents issues similar to those raised in the takeover defense
situation because conflicts between plan participants also
occur in this context. 9 The social investment of pension
assets involves investing that is based on more than purely
economic factors.9 Pension plan investment policies involving
questions of social investing may be divided into two catego-
ries: "socially sensitive investment policies,"92 and "socially
dictated investment policies."93  Commentators generally
have concluded that although socially sensitive policies may
survive scrutiny under ERISA, socially dictated policies are
unlikely to survive that scrutiny.94
90. See generally Fischel & Langbein, supra note 10, at 1143-49.
91. See Hutchinson & Cole, Legal Standards Governing Investment of Pension
Assets for Social and Political Goals, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1340, 1344-46 (1980);
Langbein & Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72, 73
(1980); Ravikoff& Curzan, Social Responsibility in Investment Policy and the Prudent
Man Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 518, 519 (1980); Comment, Nontraditional Investments
of Fiduciaries: Re-Examining the Prudent Investor Rule, 33 EMORY L.J. 1067, 1080
(1984) (authored by Leslie Joyner Bobo); see also Lanoff, The Social Investment of
Private Pension Plan Assets: May It Be Done Lawfully Under ERISA?, 31 LAB. L.J.
387, 390 (1980); Murrmann, Schaffer & Wokutch, Social Investing by State Public
Employee Pension Funds, 35 LAB. L.J. 360, 360 (1984); Comment, Job Creation for
Union Members Through Pension Fund Investment, 35 BUFFALO L. REV. 323, 324
(1986) (authored by Paul J. Wessel).
92. Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 91, at 1345 ("'Socially sensitive investment
policies' include those investment practices in which the investing fiduciary analyzes
traditional investment considerations such as plan characteristics, risk/return factors,
liquidity, and diversification. Once this analysis is completed, however, the fiduciary
then selects among financially comparable investment alternatives by considering
other factors.").
93. Id. at 1346 ("'Socially dictated investment policies' are those investment
practices and policies which either (1) permit the sacrifice of safety, return,
diversification, or marketability; or (2) are undertaken to serve some objective that
cannot be related to the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries in their
capacity as such.").
94. See, e.g., id. at 1388 ("Although there appears to be some room within the
legal framework of the statute for socially sensitive investment policies intended to
promote the retirement interests of beneficiaries, ERISA appears to proscribe policies
sacrificing financial comparability or promoting the interests of third parties in
pursuit of some broader social objective."); Lanoff, supra note 91, at 390 ("If, after
evaluating other factors, two investments appear to be equally desirable, then social
judgments are permissible in determining which to select. The point is that social
judgments may not properly be substituted for any factors which would otherwise be
considered in a given case."); Professors Langbein & Posner argue:
[S]ocial investing is undesirable because it appears to reduce the overall utility,
however broadly defined, of the investment beneficiaries. It remains to consider
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Using Fischel and Langbein's analysis, conflicts between
plan participant subgroups can be expected when a plan
trustee makes either a socially sensitive or a socially dictated
investment decision. Although conflicts over socially sensitive
investments might arguably be less pronounced because the
trustee has made an "economically comparable" investment,
plan participants can be expected to disagree over how impor-
tant a given social issue is or over how to allocate limited
pension assets between more than one socially sensitive
investment.
Conflicts between plan participants over a socially dictated
investment should be more pronounced because the invest-
ment will likely incur a quantifiable loss. This investment
decision may confer a benefit on those plan participants who
approve of the social policy." If the investment is made by
a defined-contribution plan, those plan participants who
oppose the social policy will be affected adversely because they
bear the downside risk of plan investments with no corre-
sponding benefit.96 If a defined-benefit plan makes a socially-
dictated investment, shareholders and younger-employee plan
participants who oppose the social policy will be affected
adversely because the corporate plan sponsor bears the risk of
investment losses.97 Once again, the trustee who is required
whether social investing is contrary to trust law and its statutory counterparts.
We conclude that it is ... ; a trustee who sacrifices the beneficiary's financial
well-being for any other object breaches both his duty of loyalty to the
beneficiary and his duty of prudence in investment.
Langbein & Posner, supra note 91, at 96. But see Ravikoff& Curzan, supra note 91,
at 546 ("Although the law has not settled on any particular interpretation, there is
ample reason to believe that courts will ultimately give trustees considerable freedom
to foster nontraditional goals.").
95. Some socially dictated investment decisions also will provide monetary
benefits. See Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1259
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that a New York City teachers' pension plan's decision to
buy speculative New York City bonds to avert the city's bankruptcy did not violate
state law because the investment decision benefited all plan participants), affd, 595
F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979).
Other socially dictated investment decisions arguably will benefit only some
participants spiritually and none monetarily. See generally Troyer, Slocombe &
Boisture, Divestment of South Africa Investments: The Legal Implications for
Foundations, Other Charitable Institutions, and Pension Funds, 74 GEO. L.J. 127
(1985). I believe that even a purely spiritual benefit has value for those plan
participants who agree with the socially-dictated investment decision.
96. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
97. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 10, at 1144. The use of corporate assets to
make up shortfalls from a less economically rewarding social investment adversely
affects younger employees who are plan participants and oppose the social policy
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under ERISA to act for the exclusive benefit of all plan
participants and their beneficiaries must choose between plan
participant subgroups when making a social investment
decision.
Fischel and Langbein suggest that courts should recognize
an implied duty of impartiality for pension plan trustees.9"
In situations like pension plan takeover defenses and social
investments, trustees would be required to choose impartially
between the differing interests of plan participant subgroups.99
At first glance, invoking the rubric of impartiality seems
laudable. Nevertheless, under the impartiality rule, some
subgroup of plan participants will always lose. 1' The im-
partial trustee is forced to choose one participant subgroup
over another. I doubt that a trustee will display the wisdom
of King Solomon when making these choices.
In addition, one wonders whether corporate trustees will be
any more impartial when considering the interests of different
subgroups of plan participants than they have been when
choosing between their own interests and those of participants
as a whole. In short, corporate trustees might invariably
decide on an "impartial" basis that the interests of the
subgroup that will benefit from a successful takeover de-
fense' are more important than the interests of the other
plan participants because of the trustee's strong personal
interest in seeing the takeover thwarted.' 2  Fischel and
Langbein's analysis of the problems associated with the
fiduciary duties of pension plan trustees is excellent, but their
proposed solution does not adequately address the needs of
plan participants as a whole.
A better solution is to provide more than one pension plan
to participants. Participants could then decide which plan
would best meet their particular needs. For example, one
pension plan could be designed for the needs of younger
because the depleted assets will not be available to develop corporate opportunities
or maintain current jobs.
98. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 10, at 1160.
99. See id.
100. Fischel and Langbein all but concede this point: "Recognition of a duty of
impartiality ... will not turn hard cases into easy ones." Id.
101. See supra Part II.A.
102. Officers of target corporations that are successfully raided can lose their jobs.
Coffee, supra note 63, at 24. This threat creates a strong incentive for corporate
officers who are trustees of a pension plan to use the plan in a way that will thwart
the takeover, regardless of the interests of any particular group of plan participants.
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participants, and another plan could be designed for older
participants. In the takeover situation a defined-contribution
plan trustee representing the younger participants could very
reasonably decide to try to save current jobs by purchasing
target shares to prevent a takeover. 113 In the same context,
a defined-contribution plan trustee representing older employees
might decide not to incur the loss that the takeover defense
likely would entail. All that is required to make this example
a reality is a mechanism that would allow plan participants to
transfer their interests from the "younger" plan to the "older"
plan as time went by and as they crossed a hypothetical age
threshold. Congress's decision to use a tax subsidy to encour-
age participants to prefer retirement savings would remain
unaffected as long as both the "young" and the "old" pension
plans received the same tax treatment.
The remainder of this Note will argue that by extrapolating
the simple example of easily transferable "young" and "old"
pension plans, many of the current problems and conflicts
under ERISA could be resolved or abated. This solution
requires conceiving of pension plan interests as securities-as
assets that can be easily transferred.0 4 With the development
103. In such an instance, presumably not all of the "young" participants who are
employees of the target corporation will have their pension assets invested in the
same pension plan at the time of a hostile tender offer. As long as their interests are
transferable and easily accessible, however, a group of "young" employees that wishes
to defend against the takeover would be able to form a separate defined-contribution
plan of their own for the express purpose of defending their targeted employer.
Indeed, they may go a step further and establish their own acquisition plan to
compete with an outside raider for control of the corporation. Under these special
circumstances Congress should consider whether or not these employees might
benefit from a "grace period" during which they would have an adequate amount of
time to either assist the current management in the defense of the corporation or to
establish an employee buy-out plan to compete with the raider.
Limits on the liquidity of pension plan interests may be appropriate.
Employees might be tempted to sell their retirement interests discounted to present
value for current cash consumption. Congress could create disincentives for this type
of action by creating penalties for early withdrawal as well as by removing any
deferral of income taxes on these assets.
104. The idea of treating pension interests as securities is broader than previous
proposals made for pension interest portability. In general terms, a portability
system would enable participants to transfer their interests from one employer's plan
to another, but only when participants change jobs:
Portability generally refers to an employee's ability "to carry" earned benefits
to the next employer. One of the reasons that no system of portability has been
developed to date is that two fundamental questions must first be answered:
(1) what benefits should be portable (all accrued benefits versus all vested
benefits) and (2) should only benefit credits be transferred or should plan assets
follow these credits?
Borzi, supra note 1, at 9 n.17; see generally id. at 35-37.
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of a market for pension plan interests, market forces will
supplement ERISA in disciplining pension plan trustees. Once
this fundamental conceptual barrier is crossed, one can
conceive of myriad pension plans competing for the deferred
present income of all kinds of employees. Participants will be
able to choose the portfolio of pension plans that best suits
their needs, which will eliminate conflicts in takeover defense,
social investment, and other situations. The added discipline
of market-based competition for participant interests in
pension plans should improve the performance of plan trustees
as a whole and should increase public confidence in the
pension system.
III. PENSION PLAN INTERESTS AS SECURITIES
Congress enacted broad regulations covering securities
transactions in the wake of the Great Crash of 1929.105 If
amended, these security regulations could cover interests in
pension plans. Congress's purpose in enacting these regula-
tions, the Securities Act of 1933116 (1933 Act) and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934107 (1934 Act), was to protect
securities investors."' 8 The Supreme Court has noted that
The Department of Labor has recently showed renewed interest in pension
portability. Labor Secretary Lynn Martin has proposed a measure that "would allow
employers to transfer money in a retirement plan to an individual retirement account
when a worker changes jobs." Andrews, Labor Secretary Proposes Revamping Pension
Laws, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1991, at Dl, col. 1, D7, col. 2.
Although a system of portability would be a step in the right direction, portability
inadequately resolves ERISA's more fundamental problems. Participants would be
able to transfer out of a plan only when they changed jobs. Having to change jobs to
transfer interests between pension plans would deter these transfers significantly.
To reap the benefits of market discipline, the decision to transfer into or out of a
particular plan must be divorced from the employment decision.
105. See generally 1 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 33, at 168-71.
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1988).
107. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988).
108. Congress enacted the 1933 Act to protect investors when securities are issued
to the public:
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest business.
The basic policy is that of informing the investor of the facts concerning
securities to be offered for sale in interstate and foreign commerce and
providing protection against fraud and misrepresentation.
The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of
unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation ... ;
to restore the confidence of the prospective investor in his ability to select sound
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"[t]he fundamental purpose undergirding the Securities Acts
is 'to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated securi-
ties market.'"'0 9  Disclosure requirements"' and prohibi-
tions on fraud"' reflect Congress's purpose." 2
The first inquiry, when considering any monetary interest
in light of the securities laws, is whether the interest is a
security. Some interests in pension plans are considered to be
securities and others are not." 3
securities; to bring into productive channels of industry and development
capital which has grown timid to the point of hoarding; and to aid in providing
employment and restoring buying and consuming power.
S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 item 17, at 1
(1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. This 11 volume collection by J.
Ellenberger and E. Mahar is an excellent compilation of sources for the Securities
Acts' legislative history.
The 1934 Act was intended "to provide for the regulation of securities exchanges
and of over-the-counter markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce and
through the mails, to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and
markets, and for other purposes." S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934),
reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, item 17, at 1. It was intended to protect
investors when previously-issued securities are traded on an exchange or elsewhere:
For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securities as
commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets
are affected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide
for regulation and control of such transactions and of practices and matters
related thereto ... and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets
in such transactions ....
15 U.S.C. § 78b (1988).
109. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945, 949 (1990) (quoting United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975)).
110. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
111. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) ("The design
of the [1933 Act] is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information
thought necessary to informed investment decisions."); see also Note, Curbing
Preemption of Securities Act Coverage in the Absence of Clear Congressional Direction,
72 VA. L. REV. '195, 196-97 (1986) (authored by David S. Sherman III) ("The 1933 Act
ensures that investors receive material information about securities offered for public
sale and protects investors from misrepresentation, deceit, and other fraudulent
practices in the sale of securities. In the 1934 Act, Congress extended the disclosure
and antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act to sales of securities registered for public
trading on an exchange.") (footnotes omitted).
113. Compare International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 570
(1979) (holding that interests in noncontributory, involuntary pension plans are not
securities) and Black v. Payne, 591 F.2d 83, 87-88 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a
contributory, but compulsory pension plan interest was not an investment contract),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979) with Fulk v. Bagley, 88 F.R.D. 153, 164 & n.6
(M.D.N.C. 1980) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss and holding that issues of
fact exist as to whether a voluntary, noncontributory pension plan was a security)
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Once a security interest has been found, the next inquiry is
whether a "sale of" or an "offer to sell" the security has oc-
curred." 4  The Securities Acts prohibit fraud in connection
with "sales of' and "offers to sell" securities.1
Once the sale of, or offer to sell, a security has occurred, the
next inquiry is whether the Securities Acts require disclosure
of information concerning the security. Disclosure of informa-
tion under the 1933 and 1934 Acts is accomplished through
registration of a security under these acts. 1 6  The 1933 Act
and the 1934 Act provide exemptions from registration for
some securities." 7 If registration is required for a particular
and Release No. 33-6188, supra note 31, at 8965 ("Since 1941, the [SEC] and its
staff have adhered to the position that interests in voluntary, contributory pension
and profit-sharing plans are securities.") and 2 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note
33, at 1046 ("The better view is that a voluntary, contributory, defined contribution
plan may be a security, at least when the ultimate benefits for plan participants
appear to be predominantly a factor of investment success rather collateral factors
such as vesting requirements.") and Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the
Federal Securities Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 795, 802 (1964) (pre-ERISA) ("When the Supreme Court's definition of
investment contract is applied to the trusteed pension plan with which we are
primarily concerned [the self-employed person's pension plan] the existence of a
security is clearly indicated."). See generally 2 L. LOSS & J. SELIGMAN, supra note
33, at 1042-46.
114. Under the 1933 Act:
The term "sale" or "sell" shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a
security or interest in a security, for value. The term "offer to sell", "offer for
sale", or "offer" shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation
of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1988).
Similar provisions may be found in the 1934 Act: "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase'
each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(13) (1988). "The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or
otherwise dispose of." Id. § 78c(a)(14).
115. "[T]he application of the registration and antifraud provisions of the 1933
Act depends on there being a 'sale' or an 'offer' of a security." Release No. 33-6188,
supra note 31, at 8969.
The primary antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act can be found in 15 U.S.C. § 77q
(1988). The antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act apply to securities transactions
regardless of whether registration under the Act is required. See infra note 120.
The primary antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act can be found in 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(1988), and the principal regulations are located in 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
116. Disclosure of information concerning a security under the 1933 Act is
required by 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77g, 77k (1988). Disclosure of information concerning
a security under the 1934 Act is required by 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1988). Other situations
requiring disclosure under the 1934 Act involve, for example, the solicitation of
proxies. Id. § 78n(a).
117. The provisions for exemption from registration in the 1933 Act can be found
at 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1988) and in the 1934 Act at 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)-(h) (1988).
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security, sales of that security without an effective registra-
tion statement are prohibited.11 Some interests in pension
plans are exempted from registration and others are not.119
118. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988) (1933 Act); 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1988) (1934 Act). "If
an issuer determines that an offer or sale of securities will occur in connection with
an employee benefit plan, it must either register the securities or rely upon one of the
several exemptions from registration contained in the 1933 Act." Release No. 33-
6188, supra note 31, at 8971.
The SEC describes the general regulatory structure of the 1933 Act, and the
important consequences that flow from a registration requirement as follows:
Sections 5 and 17 of the Act are the principal provisions used to implement the
Act's disclosure and antifraud purposes. Section 5 provides that every offer or
sale of a security made through the use of the mails or interstate commerce
must be accomplished through the use of a registration statement meeting the
Act's disclosure requirements, unless one of the several exemptions from
registration set out in sections 3 and 4 of the Act is available. Section 17 of the
Act prohibits the use of fraud or misrepresentation in the offer or sale of a
security.
Id. at 8962 (footnotes omitted).
119. The exemption provisions for pension plan interests in the 1933 Act can be
found at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1988) and at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.701-.703(T) (1990), and
in the 1934 Act at 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(H) (1988). The SEC explains:
Many plans are structured so that registration under the 1933 Act is not
required. Where registration is necessary, an appropriate form for this purpose
must be selected and all applicable requirements must be complied with....
The principal form used to register securities issued in connection with
employee benefit plans is Form S-8.
Release No. 33-6188, supra note 31, at 8977.
The SEC has provided the following guidance on when registration is required
under the 1933 Act:
... The 1970 Amendments to section 3(a)(2) [15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1988)]
codified in part the [SEC]'s longstanding administrative position that interests
or participations issued in connection with employee benefit plans need not be
registered unless employee funds are used to purchase employer securities. In
the Daniel decision [International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551
(1979)], however, the Supreme Court implied, in dictum, that the section 3(a)(2)
exemption extends only to the interests or participations of plans in certain
funding vehicles, rather than the interests of employees in the plans them-
selves.
The legislative history of the 1970 Amendments indicates that their original
purpose was to alleviate a concern expressed by banks and insurance companies
that there was no clear exemption from registration in the 1933 Act for
interests in the collective funding vehicles maintained by those entities for
employee benefit plans. While the amendments were under consideration,
however, language was added that reflected the [SEC]'s consistent administra-
tive practice of not requiring interests in plans to be registered except where
employee money is used to buy securities of the employer.
The staff [of the SEC] recognizes that the Supreme Court, in the Daniel
decision, did not endorse the broad view of the 3(a)(2) exemption described
above. While the statements by the Court are entitled to serious consideration,
they are dicta and therefore do not resolve the issue conclusively. This fact is
reflected in Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion, in which he stated that
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Investors who purchase securities that must be registered
receive greater protection than those who purchase exempted
securities because the registration process discloses detailed
information concerning a security to investors.
120
Congress should amend the securities laws to bring pension
plan interests within the definition of a security, to ensure
that participating in a pension plan is considered a sale of a
security, and to require the registration of most interests in
pension plans to afford the greatest protection to plan partici-
pants and beneficiaries. Congress also should encourage the
development of a market for pension plan interests. Such
treatment of pension interests would not only serve the
purposes of informing pension plan investors and of preventing
fraud in the sale of such interests, but also would serve
Congress's goal of increasing and safeguarding retirement
savings.121
A. The Definition of a Security
Congress defined the term "security" by providing a list of
the various interests which qualify, in both the 1933 Act
122
"There is no need to deal, in this case, with the scope of this exemption, since
it is not an issue presented for decision. . . ." In light of all of the foregoing,
particularly the negative effects on many plans which might flow from a narrow
construction of Section 3(a)(2), the staff will continue to view the exemption as
being applicable to both interests in funding vehicles and interests in plans.
Id. at 8972-73 (footnotes omitted).
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1988) (requiring that a 1933 Act registration statement
contain information required by Schedule A of 15 U.S.C. § 77aa); 15 U.S.C. §§ 781,
78m (1988) (detailing information required in a 1934 Act registration statement and
other required periodic reports). See generally Coffee, Market Failure and the
Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984). Even
if the registration of a security is not required because of a 1933 Act exemption, the
antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act will still apply to the issuance of a security.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 564 n.18 (1979); see also R.
JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 40 (6th ed.
1987) ("Whether or not the securities are exempt from registration, antifraud
provisions apply to all sales of securities involving interstate commerce or the
mails.").
121. See infra Part IV.
122. Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
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and the 1934 Act. 123  Congress included in this list an "in-
vestment contract," which is a general interest that has been
utilized by the federal judiciary to bring novel or unforeseen
investments within the purview of the 1933 and 1934
Acts. 124 Congress, however, left "investment contract" unde-
fined.'25 The definition of an investment contract has been
supplied by a line of Supreme Court cases commencing in
1943.126 The Court's investment contract definition is limited
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or
other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security,
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign
currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
'security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
123. Section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any
oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, any put,
call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group
or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value
thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any
instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has
a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of
days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has noted that "[the same Congress which passed the
Securities Act in 1933 approved the Securities Exchange Act in 1934, and the
definition of security contained in the 1934 Act is virtually identical to that in the
earlier enactment." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 (1967). The legislative
history of the 1934 Act supports the view that the definition of security under the
1934 Act was intended to be "substantially the same as [that] in the Securities Act
of 1933." S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 108, item 17, at 14. The Supreme Court has held that the two
definitions of security, and thus the scopes of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, are "virtually
identical." United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975). The
Court recently reaffirmed this principle in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945,
949 n.1 (1990).
124. See, e.g., SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
125. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) ("The term 'investment
contract' is undefined by the Securities Act or by relevant legislative reports.").
126. In chronological order the cases are: SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320
U.S. 344 (1943) (holding that interests in land were not merely leaseholds but were
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to its interpretation of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act; it does
not prevent Congress from enacting further legislation provid-
ing a different investment contract or security definition.
The Supreme Court in Reves v. Ernst & Young127 recently
reaffirmed its view that the 1933 and 1934 Acts were enacted
with a remedial purpose. The Court stated:
In defining the scope of the market that it wished to
regulate, Congress painted with a broad brush. It recog-
nized the virtually limitless scope of human ingenuity,
especially in the creation of "countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money
of others on the promise of profits," and determined that
the best way to achieve its goal of protecting investors was
"to define 'the term "security" in sufficiently broad and
general terms so as to include within that definition the
many types of instruments that in our commercial world
fall within the ordinary concept of a security.'" Congress
securities because an oil exploration enterprise was an inseparable part of the
interest); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (holding that interests in
portions of a citrus grove were securities because they included service contracts for
fruit cultivation and profit distribution to investors); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S.
332 (1967) (holding that withdrawable capital shares in an Illinois savings and loan
association were investment contracts because the investment involved a common
enterprise and an expectation of profits); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837 (1975) (holding that shares of common stock in a housing project were not
securities because they were purchased to obtain housing, not to reap a profit);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (holding that an
interest in a compulsory noncontributory pension plan was not a security); Marine
Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (holding that bank certificates of deposit are not
securities because investors are abundantly protected by the federal banking laws
and by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (holding that sale of all of a privately held
corporation's equity constituted the sale of a security, even though the investor
purchasing control did not derive profits from the efforts of others, because 'stock' is
a paradigm security that most people would believe to be covered by the 1933 and
1934 Acts); Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985) (holding that sale of 50% of a
privately held corporation's equity constituted the sale of a security even though the
investor purchased control because defining security based upon whether control
actually had been passed would create uncertainty in all such transactions); and
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990) (holding that uncollateralized and
uninsured demand notes sold by farmer's cooperative were securities because they
were purchased for profit, were widely distributed, would be perceived publicly as an
investment, and were unregulated by other federal laws). See Steinberg & Kaulbach,
The Supreme Court and the Definition of "Security": The "Context" Clause,
"Investment Contract" Analysis, and Their Ramifications, 40 VAND. L. REV. 489, 493-
503 (1987) (discussing the development of investment contract jurisprudence).
127. 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990).
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therefore did not attempt precisely to cabin the scope of
the Securities Acts. Rather, it enacted a definition of
"security" sufficiently broad to encompass virtually any
instrument that might be sold as an investment.
128
Although the Court observed that Congress did not "intend to
provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud,"' 2 it has found
that some unusual investments fall within the protection of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 30 The Court has stressed that
"'form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis
should be on economic reality' [because] Congress' purpose in
enacting the securities laws was to regulate investments, in
whatever form they are made and by whatever name they are
called."' 3 ' The Court has found an investment to be a secu-
rity when the public ordinarily would consider it to be one. 32
The Court also considers whether a particular investment is
protected adequately by federal regulation other than the
securities laws before it extends the protection of the 1933 and
1934 Acts.
133
128. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 949 (citations and footnote omitted).
129. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982).
130. E.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (portions of citrus grove);
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (withdrawable capital shares in an Illinois
savings and loan association).
131. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 949 (quoting Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 336).
132. See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985). The
Landreth Court stated:
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual characteristics of
stock seem to us to be the clearest case for coverage by the plain language of
the definition [in the 1933 Act]. First, traditional stock "represents to many
people, both trained and untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a
security."
Id. at 693 (citation omitted). The Landreth Court also noted, however, that "the fact
that instruments bear the label 'stock' is not of itself sufficient to invoke the coverage
of the [Securities] Acts." Id. at 686.
133. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945,952 (1990) ("Finally, we examine
whether some factor such as the existence of another regulatory scheme significantly
reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering application of the Securities
Acts unnecessary."). In Weaver, the Court reasoned that certificates of deposit do not
need the protection of the securities laws:
Deposits in federally regulated banks are protected by the reserve, reporting,
and inspection requirements of the federal banking laws; advertising relating
to the interest paid on deposits is also regulated. In addition, deposits are
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Since its formation in
1933, nearly all depositors in failing banks insured by the FDIC have received
payments in full, even payment for the portions of their deposits above the
amount insured.
Weaver, 455 U.S. at 558 (footnotes omitted); see also International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569 (1979) ("The existence of this comprehensive legislation
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Any attempt to extend the definition of a security to
encompass all pension plan interests must immediately
confront the Supreme Court's reasoning in its 1979 decision in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel.134  In
Daniel, the plaintiff was a participant in a union pension plan
that had been established before the enactment of ERISA.
135
The union plan required that participants accrue twenty years
of continuous service before they became eligible to receive
plan benefits. 136  The Daniel plan was a multiemployer
137
defined-benefit plan. 3 ' Mr. Daniel began working as a
truckdriver in 1950, joined the union in 1951 and was credited
with five years of service toward his pension when the plan
was established in 1954.139 In December 1960, he was laid
off for four months. 4 ' After the interruption, Mr. Daniel
resumed his employment and had accrued a total of over
twenty-two years of service by 1974.141 When the plan
[ERISA] governing the use and terms of employee pension plans severely undercuts
all arguments for extending the Securities Acts to noncontributory, compulsory
pension plans.").
Commentators have strongly criticized the Supreme Court's inquiry into the
existence of other protective legislation when performing its investment contract
analysis:
[This inquiry] is troubling for several reasons. First, by relying on the
"context" clause to hold that application of the antifraud provisions is
unnecessary if the transaction is governed by another comprehensive federal
scheme, the Court arguably disregarded the legislative history of the Acts as
well as its own previous interpretation of that clause. Second, the Court's
failure to apply the Howey test in a meaningful way casts doubt on whether
that test remains a viable mechanism for determining the presence of a
"security." ... Moreover, the Court's insupportable presumptions about
congressional intent threaten to undermine the objectives underlying the
federal securities laws.
Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 126, at 503; see also Note, supra note 112, at 195-
96 ("The Court's recent comparable protections approach suffers from two flaws.
First, the context clause in the Securities Acts does not justify an examination of
statutes offering comparable protections .... Second, the comparable protections
approach fails to implement congressional intent." (footnote omitted)); id. at 205-10
(analyzing Weaver).
134. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
135. Id. at 553.
136. Id. at 554.
137. Liebeler, supra note 2, at 722 ("A 'multi-employer' plan, covering the
employees of financially unrelated employers, is generally collectively bargained and
provides for transfer of pension credits among participating employers. These plans
are often industrywide in operation and may be local, regional or national in scope.").
138. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1226 (7th Cir.
1977), rev'd, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
139. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 554.
140. Id. at 555 n.4.
141. Daniel, 561 F.2d at 1226.
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administrator and the trustees denied Mr. Daniel his pension
benefits because of this involuntary break in his service, he
sued the union and pension plan trustee under, inter alia, the
securities laws.142 His legal theory was that his interest in
the plan was a security which he had purchased through
participation in the union plan and that the plan trustees had
made misstatements and had not disclosed information about
the plan as required by the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
4 3
The defendants argued that Mr. Daniel had no cause of action
under the 1933 and 1934 Acts and moved for dismissal.'
The district court denied the motion, 45 holding that Mr.
Daniel's interest in the plan was a security, 4 ' and that
there had been a sale of that security to Mr. Daniel. 147 The
defendants appealed. Although the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court's
decision, 14  the Supreme Court reversed. 49  The Daniel
litigation provoked a great deal of commentary.
50
142. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 555.
143. Id.




148. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977),
rev'd, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
149. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
150. See, e.g., Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment
Management Treatises, 94 HARv. L. REV. 561, 572-73 (1981) (agreeing with the
Supreme Court's decision in Daniel); Liebeler, supra note 2, at 710-48 (suggesting
that the lower court's expansion of the securities laws in Daniel is too burdensome
to the judiciary); Note, Interest in Pension Plans as Securities: Daniel v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 184, 195-204 (1978) (authored
by Richard A. Barasch) (arguing that Mr. Daniel's interest in his pension plan was
not a security); Comment, Securities Law-Applicability of Antifraud Provisions to
Employee Interests in Pension Plans-Daniel v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1977) (arguing that Congress did not intend
the securities laws to regulate pension plans); Note, Daniel v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters: Noncontributory Pension Funds and the Antifraud Provisions of
the Federal Securities Laws, 73 NW. U.L. REV. 550, 582 (1978) (authored by Richard
H. Donohue) (concluding that the pension interest in Daniel was a security);
Comment, Application of the Federal Securities Laws to Noncontributory, Defined
Benefit Pension Plans, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 124, 149 (1977) (authored by Robert V.
Gunderson, Jr.) (concluding that the pension interest in Daniel was not a security);
Comment, Securities Regulation of Employee Pension Plans: In the Wake of the
Daniel Decision, 38 U. PrIT. L. REV. 697, 698 (1977) (authored by David M. Brown)
(concluding that the securities laws should be applied to pension interests); Note, The
Application of the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Laws to Compulsory,
Noncontributory Plans After Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 64 VA.
L. REV. 305, 307 (1978) (authored by J. Mark Fisher) (arguing that interests in
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In analyzing whether Mr. Daniel's interest in the union
pension plan was a security, the district court, 151 the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals,"
2 and the Supreme Court
15 3
relied on SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.'54 in which the Supreme
Court previously had defined an investment contract:
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the
enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by
nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the
enterprise. 155
In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,5 ' the Court
added gloss to the Howey test by stating that the test was to
be applied in light of "the economic realities of the transac-
tion."'57 The Seventh Circuit found that the Daniel pension
compulsory, noncontributory pension plans are not securities); Comment, Securities
Law-Pension Plans-Interests in a Noncontributory, Compulsory Employee Pension
Plan Deemed Subject to the Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 22
VILL. L. REV. 195, 204 (1976) (authored by Sara Lou Spielman) (describing as
innovative the district court's holding that Mr. Daniel's interest was a security); Note,
The Impact of the Daniel Litigation: Growing Interest in Pension Vesting and
Investment Control, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 1228, 1250 (authored by Stephen J. Nording)
(concluding that the Supreme Court's decision in Daniel was correct); Note, The
Federal Securities Laws and Employee Pension Participants: Retiring Daniel, 87 YALE
L.J. 1666, 1670-71 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Retiring Daniel] ("Given the vagueness
of [the Howey] test, the Seventh Circuit's decision that employee interests in pension
plans fall within its confines was arguably correct, even though contrary interpreta-
tions are also plausible." (footnotes omitted)).
151. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. 541,550-51 (N.D. Ill.
1976), affd, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
152. Daniel, 561 F.2d at 1231.
153. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 558.
154. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
155. Id. at 298-99.
156. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
157. Id. at 851. The decision in Forman signaled a change in the previously
expansive interpretation of an investment contract:
[I]n its early post-Howey decisions construing the [Securities] Acts, the Court
adopted a flexible, expansive interpretation of the three-part Howey test. The
lower courts, expanding on the Howey test, followed suit. By the mid-1970s,
however, the Court retreated from this remedial approach.
The decision that signaled the Court's retreat was United Housing Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Forman.
Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 126, at 495 (footnotes omitted).
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plan had met the requirements of an investment contract
under the Howey test, and therefore was a security. 5 ' The
Supreme Court disagreed.'59 The Seventh Circuit got the
better of the argument. 6 '
1. Investment of money-The Supreme Court in Daniel held
that Mr. Daniel's participation in the pension plan did not
involve an investment of money.' 6 ' The Court focused on the
compulsory 6 2 and noncontributory'63 nature of the pension
plan. 6 4  It looked for "tangible and definable consideration
in return for an interest that had substantially the character-
istics of a security"'65 and concluded that although an
employee's services have value, the Daniel pension plan was
part of an inseparable compensation package in which an
employee's investment was insignificant; "[o]nly in the most
158. Daniel, 561 F.2d at 1231-38.
159. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 558-62.
160. See infra notes 161-83 and accompanying text. One commentator, reacting
unfavorably to the Supreme Court's treatment of the Howey test in Daniel, stated
that Daniel is extremely difficult to reconcile with the Howey approach. Carney,
Defining a Security: The Addition of a Market-Oriented Contextual Approach to
Investment Contract Analysis, 33 EMORY L.J. 311, 325-26 (1984). ("While Justice
Powell's majority opinion continued to pay homage to the Howey test, it ignored some
of the 'economic realities' of the securities markets.... The result is an opinion that
does not stand up well when judged solely against the Howey criteria.")
Another commentator explains his support for the Seventh Circuit's application
of the Howey test in the following way:
Read in light of its judicial interpretation, the [Howey] test supports the
[Seventh Circuit]'s conclusions that the employee's interest qualifies as an
"investment," that the pension fund constitutes a "common enterprise," that the
employee is "led to expect profits," and that the profits result solely from the
efforts of others.
Note, Retiring Daniel, supra note 150, at 1671-72 (footnotes omitted); cf. Liebeler,
supra note 2, at 748 ("Absent ERISA, a powerful argument could be made that the
most efficient way to preserve the private pension system and at the same time
promote employee retirement income security would be to subject employee interests
in pension plans to the federal securities laws.").
161. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 560-61.
162. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
164. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 559. In the view of the SEC's Division of Corporate
Finance:
The Supreme Court's opinion in [Daniel] . . . did not rest on the fact that the
plan was a defined benefit one. Instead, the Court based its decision on the
involuntary nature of the plan (unlike all prior cases of the Court involving
securities, the employees did not have a choice whether to participate) and the
fact that the plan did not provide for direct, identifiable contributions by
employees (the employees' labor could be considered a contribution "only in the
most abstract sense.").
Release No. 33-6188, supra note 31, at 8964 (footnotes omitted).
165. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 560.
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abstract sense may it be said that an employee 'exchanges'
some portion of his labor in return for these possible bene-
fits."166 The Daniel Court also held that contributions to the
pension plan by Mr. Daniel's employer were not made on his
behalf:
[T]here was no fixed relationship between contributions to
the [defined-benefit plan] and an employee's potential
benefits.... One who has engaged in covered employment
for 20 years will receive the same benefits as a person who
has worked for 40, even though the latter has worked
twice as long and induced a substantially larger employer
contribution. 167
The Daniel Court's characterization of the "realities" of a
pension plan transaction are open to question. A more
realistic view of the transaction is that the Daniel plan
involved a voluntarily investment of money. An employee
receives significant compensation for her services in two
forms. The first is her paycheck, which is present income.
The second is in the form of deferred income, which is either
deducted from her paycheck or contributed directly by her to
a pension plan. The fact that the Daniel plan was noncontrib-
utory, and that the employer physically made contributions to
the pension plan, cannot be determinative."'8 The Daniel
Court failed to recognize that the employees made a conscious
decision, voiced through their union representatives, to
participate and invest in a retirement plan. '69
166. Id.
167. Id. at 561.
168. Such a rule would create a large loophole in the coverage of the Securities
Acts. Under such a rule, issuers, to avoid the securities laws, could simply interpose
a "middleman" when selling securities and then claim that the purchaser made no
investment.
169. As Professors Fischel and Langbein explain:
The typical pension or welfare benefit plan is operated by one employer for the
employees of that firm. These so-called "single employer plans" may be the result
of collective bargaining or may be sponsored by nonunionized firms. In some
industries, however, particularly those in which employment patterns are episodic
and in which multifirm or industry-wide collective bargaining is common (for
example, the construction trades, entertainment, trucking, the needle trades),
individual firms do not sponsor plans. Rather, the union takes the initiative
through the collective bargaining process for establishing the pension and benefit
plans, and numerous employers contribute to the union sponsored plan.
Fischel & Langbein, supra note 10, at 1111.
It should not matter that a particular employee joins a union after the pension plan
is bargained for or that black letter labor law does not consider an individual employee
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Even in cases where a collective bargaining process does not
establish the pension plan, courts should view employees as
voluntarily participating in the plan because they have elected
to trade their services for a compensation package that
includes a pension plan interest. 7 °
Finally, by emphasizing the fact that contributions are not
tied directly to a particular employee, the Court ignored the
fundamental importance of the allocation of risk in a transac-
tion creating a defined-benefit plan. The participants in
Daniel's defined-benefit plan were not purchasing only a
retirement benefit. They were purchasing a guaranteed
benefit. The contract that created the plan in Daniel allocated
the risk of plan losses to the sponsoring employers and
allocated the risk of "over-contribution" by a forty year worker
to the participants. Thus, it begs the question to determine
that no investment was involved simply because there was no
fixed relationship between contributions and benefits. This
investment device's variable relationship and allocation of risk
was precisely what the parties bargained for and what the
participants invested in.
2. Common enterprise-The Seventh Circuit found that the
union pension plan constituted a common enterprise under
Howey."' It stated: "Here the enterprise is common to all of
the [union] members. The pension fund trustees self-admittedly
exercise exclusive control over the common enterprise and the
investment of its assets. The pension fund which receives the
union members' investments is a common enterprise under
Howey."'72 The Supreme Court did not challenge the Sev-
enth Circuit's holding on this point.'73
to be a party to a collective bargaining agreement. See Daniel v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1243 n.40 (7th Cir. 1977) (stating that an employee is not
a party to the collective bargaining agreement "in the technical labor law sense"), rev'd,
439 U.S. 551 (1979). This employee should be viewed as having assented to the
transaction after the fact. See id. at 1243.
170. Daniel, 561 F.2d at 1243 ("[V]olition is present to the extent that [the union]
members voted whether or not to accept the collective bargaining contract containing
this pension fund and whether to ratify subsequent agreements governing the level
of employer contributions into the fund or seek dismissal of union officers or the
unlikely radical measure of decertification of the Union."). Contra Daniel, 439 U.S.
at 560.
171. Daniel, 561 F.2d at 1233.
172. Id.
173. See Daniel, 439 U.S. at 561-62. As Professor Carney explains:
The Daniel decision contained no discussion of the common enterprise test
nor did it address the issue of whether the significant managerial efforts were
those of others. As to these tests there could be little doubt that Howey's
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3. Expectation of profits from the efforts of others-In one of
the most troubling parts of its opinion, the Daniel Court held
that the union plan participants had no expectation of profits
from the efforts of the plan trustee under the plan.17 4 The
Daniel Court reasoned:
It is true that the [Daniel plan], like other holders of large
assets, depends to some extent on earnings from its
assets. In the case of a pension fund, however, a far
larger portion of its income comes from employer contribu-
tions, a source in no way dependent on the efforts of the
[Daniel plan]'s managers. The [Daniel plan], for example,
earned a total of $31 million through investment of its
assets between February 1955 and January 1977. During
this same period employer contributions totaled $153
million. Not only does the greater share of a pension
plan's income ordinarily come from new contributions, but
unlike most entrepreneurs who manage other people's
money, a plan usually can count on increased employer
contributions, over which the plan itself has no control, to
cover shortfalls in earnings. 75
The Daniel Court arguably misunderstood the operation of
pension plans in general and defined-benefit plans in partic-
ular. Pension plans depend on earnings from their invest-
ments to generate assets, earnings that depend on the efforts
of people other than the plan participants themselves.'
6
The fact that the Daniel plan earned only $31 million from
investment profits does not support a finding that profits from
pension plan investments are insignificant. For instance, one
cannot determine from the Court's opinion whether the Daniel
plan trustees pursued a conservative strategy with a lower
standards were met, since funds in Daniel were pooled and managed by plan
trustees in exactly the same manner as in a mutual fund.
Carney, supra note 160, at 327 (footnote omitted).
174. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 561-62.
175. Id.
176. Id. As Professor Carney explains:
Clearly the pension plan [in Daniel] invested the employer contributions in
exactly the same manner as any investment company made investments, and
expected returns from its efforts, whether in the form of dividends from stocks
bought, interest on corporate bonds, or appreciation of the portfolio. The
magnitude of these gains would obviously depend upon the investment skill of
the particular fund's managers.
Carney, supra note 160, at 327 (footnote omitted).
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rate of return or a risky and potentially more profitable
investment strategy. 177 One fact is clear, however. During
the period between February 1955 and January 1977, approxi-
mately 20% of the Daniel plan's income came from investment
profits. 17  These profits are by no means "one of [the plan's]
less important aspects" as the Court claimed.
17
The fact that the employer in Daniel could be expected to
make contributions to the plan to cover shortfalls is not
surprising. The Daniel plan was a defined-benefit plan. The
downside risk of plan investments rests with the sponsor of a
defined-benefit plan. 8 ° The fact that the employer agreed
to guarantee benefits does not make the pension plan
arrangement any less profit-motivated. The employer and
plan participants bargained to allocate risks precisely this
way. There can be no question that defined-contribution
plans are profit-seeking and depend on earnings from assets
because all investment risks in these plans are borne by plan
participants.'
The Daniel Court's final ground for holding that Mr. Daniel
had little expectation of profits for the purposes of the Securi-
ties Acts was "the fact that where a plan has substantial
preconditions to vesting, the principal barrier to an individual
employee's realization of pension benefits is not the financial
health of the [plan]. Rather, it is his own ability to meet the
[plan]'s eligibility requirements."8 2 An investment is not
any less a security because profits are contingent on specific
events in the future. Investors buy shares hoping that future
events will bring profits to the issuer of the shares.8 3 The
177. See Daniel, 439 U.S. at 561-62.
178. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
179. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 561; see also Carney, supra note 160, at 327 ("The
[Daniel] opinion. . . seemed to examine the actual operation of this particular plan,
rather than what investors such as Daniel might reasonably have expected to
occur.").
180. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
182. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 562.
183. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1233 (7th Cir.
1977) ("[C]ontingent expectancies are the rule rather than the exception in the equity
markets. Profits in an equity security require that the market value plus accrued
dividends of a stock be greater than the stockholder's cash basis. Thus profits are
contingent on the successful operation of the common enterprise .... "), rev'd, 439
U.S. 551 (1979).
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mere existence of a contingency on the realization of profits
could not be what led the Court to find that no security was
present. If the magnitude of the contingency is troublesome,
Congress should amend ERISA to reduce pension eligibility
requirements.
B. Sale of the Pension Plan Interest
The Seventh Circuit held that a sale occurred when an
employee traded services for an interest in the plan, bringing
the transaction within the coverage of the Securities Acts.
184
The Seventh Circuit found that a disposition of a security for
value had occurred." 5 Mr. Daniel had acquired an interest
in a security and had supplied value for the interest by
rendering services to his employer who then made contribu-
tions to the plan."8 6 The Supreme Court did not need to
reach the issue of whether a sale had occurred because it
found that no security was involved.8 7
184. Id. at 1242-44.
185. Id. at 1242.
186. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the Seventh Circuit relied on recent SEC
interpretations of the Securities Acts to the effect that acquiring an interest in a
compulsory pension plan involved a sale. See id. at 1243-44. This new interpreta-
tion of the Securities Acts represented a reversal of the SEC's previous "no sale"
policy. Id. at 1244 ("[T]he [SEC] had in the past applied a no-sale rule to pension
trusts as to the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.... ."). Judge Tone, concur-
ring in the Seventh Circuit's opinion, was not impressed with the SEC's reversal of
position:
[C]onsidering the breadth of the definitions of"investment contract" and "sale"
in the statutes themselves and the interpretation of those terms in cases we
must still regard as authoritative, I believe the balance tips in favor of [Mr.
Daniel]'s position.
In reaching this conclusion, I have found little comfort in the opinion
expressed by the SEC, as amicus curiae. Apparently for the first time ever, it
now takes the position in its brief before us that the employee's interest or
expectancy in a plan such as this is subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the
securities laws.
Id. at 1251 (Tone, J., concurring); see also Liebeler, supra note 2, at 715-17.
In its reversal, the Supreme Court criticized the Seventh Circuit for being too
deferential to the SEC's interpretation of the securities laws. Daniel, 439 U.S. at
563, 565-69.
187. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 562.
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C. Registration and Exemption
Mr. Daniel brought his claims under the antifraud
provisions of the Securities Acts only; he did not claim that a
prohibited sale of an unregistered security had occurred.'88
Therefore, the issues of whether the Daniel pension plan was
required to be registered and whether it was exempt from
registration were not before the Court.8 9
D. ERISA's Pervasive Regulatory Scheme
The Daniel Court added that "[i]f any further evidence were
needed to demonstrate that pension plans of the type involved
are not subject to the Securities Acts, the enactment of ERISA
in 1974 . . . would put the matter to rest."1 90 This state-
ment, however, is dictum.' 9' The Court's reliance on ERISA
to protect plan participants and insure pension plan interests
is arguably imprudent.
ERISA creates an impossible task for pension plan trustees
because a pension trustee's investment decision requires a
choice between the conflicting interests of different subgroups
of plan participants. 92  Almost invariably, an ERISA
trustee's decision will adversely affect the interests of one
subgroup of participants.
Reliance on ERISA's scheme of federal pension plan insur-
ance also is not prudent. Defined-contribution plans are not
covered by ERISA's insurance scheme.'93 Only $631 billion
of the $1.7 trillion in private retirement pension plan assets
are insured.'94
188. See id. at 555-56.
189. Id. at 570 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("I join in the opinion of the Court except
as to the discussion of the 1970 amendment to § 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act [of 1933,
which sets out exemptions for interests in pension plans]. There is no need to deal,
in this case, with the scope of the exemption, since it is not an issue presented for
decision.").
190. See id. at 569-70 (citation omitted). Commentators have criticized the
Supreme Court's inquiry into the existence of other protective legislation. See supra
note 133.
191. Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 126, at 505-06; Note, supra note 112, at
202 n.61.
192. See supra Parts I & II.
193. 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (1988); see also supra note 41.
194. 1990 ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at 360 (table no. 591).
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ERISA's enforcement mechanisms are lax, and public confi-
dence in the private pension system has been shaken.'95
Surrounding the Supreme Court's recent decision in Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp.1"' were fears that a
pension bailout might be on the horizon. 9 7 Although some
reports characterized the Court's decision as one that averted
a bailout, 198 is it prudent to rely solely on ERISA to protect
private retirement assets?
Using pension plan assets to defend against takeovers and
to make social investments has raised questions that the
Daniel Court arguably did not consider in 1979. By refusing
to characterize an employee's interest in a pension plan as a
security, the Daniel Court created a financial marriage
between plan participant and plan trustee, leaving the
participant at the mercy of the trustee or with a costly remedy
in the courts.
The Daniel Court's decision, of course, merely interprets the
Securities Acts. Congress should enact legislation taking a
more economically realistic view. Congress could provide
195. See Castro, Is Your Pension Safe?, TIME, June 3, 1991, at 42; see also supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
196. 110 S. Ct. 2668 (1990) (holding that the PBGC had the authority to order a
corporation in bankruptcy to resume funding a terminated pension plan when the
corporation's financial circumstances had improved dramatically).
197. This story appeared in the Washington Post four days before the LTV
decision was handed down. See Swoboda, supra note 20, at C1, col. 2 ("The federal
insurance fund protecting the pensions of 50 million American workers could soon
find itself billions of dollars in debt and unable to meet its obligations .. .
198. For example, one report stated:
The 8 to 1 decision in a ase involving the LTV Corp. averted a potential
financial crisis for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., which insures $ 1
trillion in private pension benefits for 40 million workers much the way the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. insures bank deposits....
If the court had ruled against the PBGC, the agency would have had to
assume $ 2 billion in LTV's pension liabilities and the door would have been
opened for it to assume responsibility for other financially troubled companies
in the future.
Swoboda, Pension Protection Broadened, Washington Post, June 19, 1990, at Al, col.
1; see also Arndt, Court Rules LTV Liable for Pensions-Steel Firm Ordered: Pay $2.5
Billion, Chicago Tribune, June 19, 1990, at Al, col. 6 ("The Supreme Court ruled
Monday that bankrupt LTV Corp. must resume responsibility for voided pension
plans, sparing the federal agency that insures the pensions of one of every five adults
an enormous-and potentially ruinous-expense."); Savage, Pension Agency Powers
Upheld, L.A. Times, June 19, 1990, at Al, col. 5 ("The Supreme Court ruled Monday
that a corporation in bankruptcy can be forced to keep funding its pension plans,
heading off a potential multibillion-dollar crisis for the federal agency that insures
pensions for nearly 40 million Americans.").
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pension plan participants with increased investment security
by providing a market for pension investments and by
requiring plan trustees to disclose information about plans
under the securities laws. Market forces would then discipline
plan trustees, and participants would have the simple self-help
remedy of being able to transfer out of a plan not comporting
with their interests.
IV. A POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE PENSION PLAN SECURITY
When Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, it balanced the
benefits of regulating private pension plans against the costs
of regulatory compliance.1 99 Congress was concerned with
the abuses that occurred prior to ERISA, °° yet it also was
concerned that overregulation might deter the formation of
new pension plans or eliminate existing plans.20 1
ERISA's "costs" include low confidence,20 2 low pension plan
participation, 23  and conflicts between plan participant
subgroups.2"4 Significant benefits beyond those that ERISA
199. As the House Ways and Means Committee stated:
[Tihe committee has been mindful of the need to construct the new require-
ments so that they will provide meaningful improvement in the various problem
areas noted under the present law. At the same time, the committee is aware
that under our voluntary pension system, the cost of financing pension plans
is an important factor in determining whether any particular retirement plan
will be adopted and in determining the benefit levels if a plan is adopted, and
that unduly large increases in costs could impede the growth and improvement
of the private retirement system. For this reason, in the case of those require-
ments which add to the cost of financing retirement plans, the committee has
sought to adopt provisions which strike a balance between providing meaningful
reform and keeping costs within reasonable limits.
H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4670, 4681-82.
200. Id. at 13-14, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4670, 4681
('There has also been concern about the administration of pension plans. It has been
charged that all too frequently pension funds have not been used in the best interest
of covered employees. There have been cases of extreme misuse of pension funds.").
201. Id. at 14-15, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4670, 4682;
see also Liebeler, supra note 2, at 726 ("But while Congress wanted to protect pension
benefits, it was also concerned that federal regulation might eliminate or significantly
reduce the number of private pension plans." (footnote omitted)).
202. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
204. See supra Parts I & II.
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provides could be attained by making pension interests
transferable and marketable.2"5 Transforming these inter-
ests into securities and applying the securities laws to them is
a plausible method for achieving the benefits of transferability
and marketability.
In arguing that the securities laws should regulate transfer-
able pension plan interests, a primary consideration is
whether the costs of such a scheme would outweigh its
benefits. The most obvious costs of this scheme would be
incurred by pension plans in complying with the securities
laws. The costs of compliance would involve specifically: the
costs of learning how the securities laws would apply to
pension interests; the costs to the government of administering
205. I assume that a market for pension plan interests could be created. This
assumption involves a chicken and egg question in that no market will exist until
pension plan interests are transferable. Once transferability exists, creating a
market should not be difficult. Shares in a pension plan would closely resemble
shares in a mutual fund. I believe that assuming that a market for pension plan
interests will exist does not involve "assuming the can opener." See Coffee, supra
note 120, at 739 n.64 ("This refers to the standard joke about the two scientists and
an economist stranded on a deserted island with only a can of beans for food, which
they cannot open. The physicist develops a theory for breaking open the can, and the
chemist similarly devises a plan for boiling it open, but the economist suggests the
simplest plan: 'Assume a can opener.'"). Some criticism of using the securities laws
for the regulation of pension interests begins with the premise that there is no
market for pension interests. The argument is essentially that because there is no
market for pension interests that could process and value pension information,
mandatory disclosure under the securities laws would not help plan participants:
The [Securities] Acts' valuation function serves those investors who make
investment choices and have a means of processing the information disclosed.
But disclosure would be of no use to pension participants principally because
they do not make pension choices. Employees cannot choose their pension plans
as investors do shares of stock or mutual funds: particular plans attach to
particular jobs or to membership in a particular union. ...
Even if employees did choose their plans, the securities laws' valuation
function would be of little use, for most employees would be unable to process
the laws' disclosures. Like conventional investors, pension plan participants
can only rarely assimilate data of sufficient complexity to allow an accurate
valuation of their personal interests. Unlike conventional investors, pension
plan participants cannot expect services to spring up that would be capable of
assimilating the data for them at an acceptably low cost [because there is no
market intermediary evaluating disclosures under ERISA]. Nor can they rely
on an efficient market to incorporate expert interpretations of the information
into a price that they could easily use, as conventional investors do, to compare
the values of their interests with those of others. Indeed pension interests are
not "bought" and "sold" in markets anything like those the [Securities] Acts
were intended to regulate.
Note, Retiring Daniel, supra note 150, at 1685 (footnotes omitted). This argument
loses its vitality in the presence of a market for transferable pension interests.
SPRING AND SUMMER 1991]
750 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:3 & 4
the new pension laws;2 °6 and the costs to plans of disclosing
required information under the securities laws.2 °7
Applying the securities laws to pension interests will
involve learning costs on the part of plan trustees who will be
required to comply with the securities laws. In addition,
trustees will incur litigation costs in resolving ambiguities in
the application of the securities laws to pension interests. The
fact that these cost arguments militate against all legislative
enactments weakens their strength considerably. Finally,
after fifty years, the securities laws are venerable and many
ambiguities under them have been resolved.20 8
The debate over the costs and benefits of mandatory disclo-
sure under the securities laws2 9 has evolved since the
securities laws' enactment. 210  This debate is relevant to
applying the securities laws and mandatory disclosure
thereunder to pension interests, in the context of a pension
interest market. The initial justifications for requiring
disclosure of information concerning a security were protection
of individual investors and the integrity of the market.21'
Professor Coffee, however, has discredited these rationales as
206. I do not propose to discuss at great length the overall costs to the
government of administering the pension laws if pension interests are transformed
into securities. Suffice it to say that Congress would have a number of options when
deciding which governmental agency should administer these new laws. A clearly
undesirable alternative would be to add the SEC to the list of agencies (the
Department of Labor, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation) that now have concurrent responsibility for ERISA's
administration. See supra note 20. If Congress were to consolidate pension law
administration under one agency at the same time that it transformed pension
interests into securities, it could possibly lower the overall cost of pension law
administration. Klimkowsky and Lanoffhave argued for the consolidation of ERISA's
enforcement. Klimkowsky & Lanoff, supra note 20, at 89 ("IfERISA is to be enforced
and pension policy is to be made in a rational rather than a haphazard manner,
ERISA administration must be consolidated into a single agency.").
207. See Note, Retiring Daniel, supra note 150, at 1684-85.
208. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-214 (1976) (holding
that an allegation of scienter is required for an action for damages to lie under a
private right of action under Rule 10b-5); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300-
01 (1946) (defining investment contract).
209. See, e.g., 1 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 33, at 171-225; Coffee, supra
note 120, at 723-37; Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 707-14 (1984); Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms
of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 635-42 (1984); Stout, The Unimportance of
Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities
Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 619-40 (1988).
210. See, e.g., Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Disclosure System,
9 J. CORP. L. 1, 1-4 (1983).
211. See supra note 108.
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being insufficient to justify mandatory disclosure in the
context of modern markets.212 Current arguments for man-
datory disclosure involve several rationales.
Professors Loss and Seligman argue that the protection of
individual investors and the integrity of the market leads to
allocative efficiency213 in the capital markets.2 4 They argue
that mandatory disclosure reduces the risk involved in trading
securities.2"5 Thus, mandatory disclosure promotes several
salutary goals:
[Mandatory] disclosure would tend to reduce the risk
premiums that issuers selling new securities would have
to pay, thus increasing the funds available for economic
growth. Reduction of investors' concerns that securities
fraud waves periodically may drive down securities price
levels will tend to increase propensities to save. And
reduction in the volatility of market price swings (caused
by investor ignorance of material data) will tend to
increase allocative efficiency.21 6
212. Professor Coffee has noted the significant impact of the professional
securities analyst on the operation of the capital markets:
Easy as it is today to criticize the original premise of the federal securities
laws-i.e., that mandatory disclosure would enable the small investor to
identify and invest in higher quality and lower risk securities-such criticism
does not take us very far because its target has shifted. The securities markets
have evolved significantly since the 1930's, and one of the most important
developments is the appearance of the professional securities analyst....
The work of the securities analyst can be subdivided into two basic functions.
First, the analyst searches for information obtainable from non-issuer sources
bearing on the value of a corporate security .... Second, the analyst verifies,
tests, and compares the issuer's disclosures, both to prevent deliberate fraud
and to remove the unconscious bias that usually affects all forms of information
transfer.
Coffee, supra note 120, at 723-24 (footnotes omitted). Professor Coffee adds, "[t]hus,
the contemporary impact of the '34 Act may lie less in providing usable information
to the ultimate investor than it does in reducing costs for the securities analyst." Id.
at 728.
213. Allocative efficiency in this context may be defined as the capacity of the
capital markets to invest capital accurately and efficiently to ensure that scarce
resources are put to their best use. See id. at 734-35.
214. See 1 L. LOSS & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 33, at 218-20.
215. Id.
216. Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic
Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1118 (1985). Professor Stout recently challenged the
notion that stock prices influence the efficiency of resource allocation: "A closer look
at the economic consequences of stock prices suggests that the principal function of
stock prices is not resource allocation but rather the redistribution of wealth among
investors. Consequently, more efficient public stock markets may contribute little to
allocative efficiency." Stout, supra note 209, at 618.
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Reviewing empirical evidence on the impact of the 1933 Act,
Professor Coffee argues that, in fact, mandatory disclosure has
increased the allocative efficiency of the capital markets:
The most logical conclusion to draw from this evidence is
that allocative efficiency was enhanced and that investors
thereby benefitted. The key point then is that the social
benefit of the federal securities laws may exceed their
benefit to investors. The beneficiaries of increased
allocative efficiency include virtually all members of
society, not just investors.217
From Professor Coffee's perspective, the securities laws'
scheme of mandatory disclosure can "be seen as a desirable
cost reduction strategy through which society, in effect,
subsidizes search costs to secure both a greater quantity of
information and a better testing of its accuracy."21 He also
argues that in the absence of a mandatory disclosure system,
voluntary disclosure will not protect investors adequately
because the interests of shareholders and managers of capital
cannot be completely aligned, and "greater inefficiency would
exist ... because excess social costs would be incurred by
investors pursuing trading gains."219 The same benefits
from mandatory disclosure will accrue to investors and society
as a whole when mandatory disclosure is applied to trans-
ferable pension plan interests.
The costs of mandatory disclosure should not outweigh its
benefits. ERISA already requires periodic reporting and
disclosure.22 ° ERISA disclosure causes employers to incur
costs but has limited utility because, in the context of non-
transferable pension interests, employees cannot use it to
choose between different pension investments. Once pension
plan interests become transferable, disclosure will have much
more utility.
To the extent possible, Congress should integrate disclosure
under ERISA and the securities laws to avoid duplicative
217. Coffee, supra note 120, at 735-36 (footnote omitted).
218. Id. at 722.
219. Id.
220. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1988); see also supra note 11.
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efforts.22' Integrated disclosure can reduce the costs of
disclosure by preventing duplicative reporting efforts.
A market for pension plan interests should increase signifi-
cantly the number of people who are covered by pension plans.
In her discussion of the inadequate coverage of ERISA pension
plans, Borzi describes which employees are left uncovered and
why.222 In the 1980s only 22.9% of the employees of compa-
nies with less than 100 employees had pension plans.223
"[T]he workers least likely to be covered under a pension plan
are those who are young, work for a small nonunion company
of fewer than 100 employees, and earn less than $10,000 a
year."
224
Borzi identifies four reasons why small companies do not
establish plans:
" Small companies cannot take advantage of the economies
of scale to limit the costs of establishing and administering
plans.
" Pension plans in general, and defined-benefit plans in
particular, are burdensome in the sense that they require
supervisory efforts by company management, there is a
disincentive to the formation of plans by small companies.
" The demands of operating a small business consume most
of the management's energy, a small business is "unlikely
to seek out someone to establish a plan."
" There is little or no incentive to market plans to these
companies.
225
221. In 1982, the SEC adopted a system of integrated disclosure 'governing the
registration of securities under the Securities Act of 1933." Adoption of Integrated
Disclosure System, 1933 Securities Act Release No. 33-6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380,
11,380 (Mar. 16, 1982). The integrated disclosure system allows certain issuers that
already file periodic reports with the SEC to incorporate those reports into new issue
registrations. Id. at 11,382-83.
Professor Merritt Fox describes integrated disclosure this way:
The SEC, recognizing that publicly held corporations are required under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934... to file periodic reports containing financial
and other information of interest to prospective securities purchasers, now
permits a large class of issuers to use a short form Securities Act [of 1933]
registration statement that provides for this information to be incorporated by
reference rather than repeated.
Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: An
Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (1984) (footnotes omitted). See
generally 2 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 33, at 599-620.
222. Borzi, supra note 1, at 23-30.
223. Id. at 24.
224. Id.
225. See id. at 25-28.
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Borzi continues by suggesting three approaches to solving this
problem.
First, small companies could be required to establish
pension plans.226 She concludes that the adoption of this
approach is unlikely because it requires "a reversal of our
longstanding policy of a voluntary private pension sys-
tem."227  Second, Congress could create tax incentives for
establishment of plans by small companies.2 2 ' Borzi remains
skeptical of this approach, however, concluding that "it is not
clear that tax incentives will work."229  Finally, incentives
could be created for third parties to market plans to small
companies.23 ° Borzi concludes: "The hardest part of devel-
oping policy options in this area is the difficulty in identifying
incentives [to market plans]. More creative study is certainly
needed."231
A market for pension plan interests would in large measure
solve or abate these coverage problems by creating incentives
to sell plan interests to small firm employees. Large invest-
ment firms can be expected to establish national pension
plans, once a national market for these plans exists. These
investment firms will have a profit-based motive to market
interests in their pension plans to employees everywhere.
The development of a market for transferable interests in
pension plans will produce immediate benefits for pension
plan participants and trustees. The transferability of plan
interests will substantially reduce a plan trustee's dilemma
arising from an investment decision that divides pension
participants. A trustee who announces a particular invest-
ment strategy can be assured that participants who disagree
with the strategy will transfer out of the plan. Similarly,
participants of other plans who think the strategy is sound
will transfer into the fund. The pension plan trustee will, by
definition, act in the exclusive interest of plan participants
226. Id. at 26.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 27.
229. Id. "Many [small companies] are not profitable enough to pay taxes. The
debate, therefore, over whether a tax credit or a tax deduction is a greater incentive
is irrelevant. Unless a refundable tax credit is used as an incentive, tax incentives
alone will probably not increase coverage significantly." Id. (footnote omitted).
230. Borzi, supra note 1, at 28. Borzi suggests that incentives to market either
a simplified defined-contribution plan or a new type of multiemployer defined-benefit
plan might exist if such plans were available. Id.
231. Borzi, supra note 1, at 29.
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because plan participants will make the determination of what
is in their exclusive interest.2 A market for pension inter-
ests should reduce conflicts between different employee groups
because they will transfer to another plan if a trustee makes
an undesirable decision.
An additional benefit is that the plan members will be able
to diversify a greater portion of their assets-including their
human and monetary capital-and move them away from their
employer. Lack of asset diversification is a significant problem
for employees who have all of their human capital invested
with their employer.233 The pension interest security concept
will allow an employee to direct her stream of deferred income
to any pension plan she wants. An employee could diversify
her pension plan capital away from any one particular pension
plan because she will be able to invest in more than one plan.
A rational investor will attempt to reduce her investment risks
by diversifying her investment portfolio. 4
The overall cost of administering pension plans should
decrease as administrators are forced to compete with each
other for pension plan assets235 and as plan trustees try to
reduce overhead and become more efficient to compete in the
market for plan interests.
Society as a whole will benefit when the paternalistic
misconceptions of the present system of retirement savings are
debunked. Some people may believe that the average plan
232. The trustee still will have plenty to worry about, though. If the strategy is
fundamentally unsound, most participants will transfer out of the plan, leaving the
trustee with no assets and without a job.
233. Professor Coffee argues:
Managers are inherently overinvested in the firm they serve ....
.. [T]he manager's most important asset is his or her job. Although the
manager generally does not have a recognized property right in his [or her]
employment relationship with the corporation, this relationship still has a
present value to the manager equal to the discounted earnings stream he or she
expects to receive from that job (or career path) until retirement....
* . . [T]he manager is over-invested [sic] in his [or her] own firm because the
firm in its own interest rewards him [or her] with a generally nontransferable
interest in itself through stock options and other fringe benefits.
Coffee, supra note 63, at 17-18.
234. Id. at 17 ("Modern financial theory assumes that rational shareholders will
hold diversified portfolios.").
235. See P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS-PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES
8 (4th ed. 1988) ("Competitive forces generate efficiency in two ways. Productive
efficiency occurs as low cost producers undersell and thereby displace the less
efficient. Allocative efficiency occurs as exchanges in the marketplace direct
production away from goods and services that consumers value less and toward those
they value more . ").
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participant does not have the sophistication to take advantage
of the additional contractual freedom which a market for
pension interests would provide. I disagree. First, all plan
participants will have a strong incentive to take advantage of
the market. Rational plan participants will want to make, not
lose, money. Second, I believe that most plan participants are
sophisticated enough to take advantage of the opportunities in
a pension interest market.236 Even granting that there may
be a threshold level of market sophistication among plan
participants below which the choice of plans will not be
meaningful, many participants will benefit from the freedom
of choice that they gain.
V. CONCLUSION
If investor confidence is to come back to the benefit of
exchanges and corporations alike, the law must advance.
As a complex society so diffuses and differentiates the
financial interests of the ordinary citizen that he has to
trust others and cannot personally watch the managers of
all his interests as one horse trader watches another, it
becomes a condition of the very stability of that society that
its rules of law and of business practice recognize and
protect that ordinary citizen's dependent position.237
This passage concerning the 1934 Act, written over 50 years
ago, is relevant today in the context of transferable pension
plan interests. ERISA's pervasive regulatory scheme is
fundamentally flawed. In pension plan takeover defenses,
social investments, and other situations, plan trustees cannot
satisfy ERISA by acting for the exclusive benefit of plan
participants because the members themselves have conflicting
interests. Courts and commentators have struggled to
reconcile the interests of plan trustees and plan participants
with the goals of ERISA, but they have yet to achieve a
satisfactory solution.
236. Plan participants could hire a portfolio manager to take advantage of the
market for them if they do not believe that they can make the best investment
choices.
237. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATwE
HISTORY, supra note 108, item 18, at 5 (emphasis added).
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These difficult problems could be resolved or reduced by
implementing the concept of a transferable pension plan
interest and by encouraging the development of a market for
such interests. Plan participants then could invest in pension
plans which meet their particular needs, and plan trustees no
longer would face the impossible task of satisfying plan
participants with mutually exclusive interests. In addition,
the inadequate level of trustee monitoring currently tolerated
under ERISA would be supplemented by the discipline of a
market competing for pension plan capital.
New legislation transforming pension plan interests into
transferable securities and encouraging a market for these
interests will produce positive societal gains. Pension plan
capital will be allocated more efficiently and plan participants
will enjoy increased contractual freedom. Congress should
reconsider the decisions it made in 1974. Once again, it is
time for the law to advance.
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